The regime of Augusto Pinochet is often thought to be a prime example of market principles and economic liberalism. It is noted for its Chicago Boys-style market reforms pushed forward by a military government, and more specifically by Pinochet himself.
All this notwithstanding, one of the legacies left behind by Augusto Pinochet is the contradiction between authoritarian rule and economic liberalism. Preaching duty, self-sacrifice and the fatherland above all, the junta brought in the Chicago Boys, an economic team that studied at the University of Chicago, dedicated to opening the market and allowing the pursuit of self-interest and profit.
The crucial contradiction was the attempt to impose economic freedom under the guise of a military dictatorship. Latin America had never seen such a mixture before. With military dictatorships the norm, economic nationalism and control of the economy were the normal routes to economic policy. Pinochet turned the tables on this formula, decontrolling the economy and liberating economic forces. On the one hand, the government was allowing freedom in the economic sphere while on the other hand, controlling every other aspect of life with its authoritarian rule. Without any type of moral foundation or educational process that would explain the workings of a market economy, Augusto Pinochet decided to open up Chile’s protected and antiquated economy and expose it to the modern world.
While rumors abound about the real Augusto Pinochet, there is nothing in his past that suggests that he ever embraced classical liberalism. He entered military school at the age of 18 and was influenced by a military posture his whole life. The Chilean military was originally shaped by German military advisers and in dress and action, one can recognize similarities. In his own words, during World War II, Pinochet described how the young officers of his time sympathized with the Axis powers, especially Germany. After the War, Pinochet was openly sympathetic to the fascist regime of Francisco Franco and made one of this rare trips abroad to Spain to attend his Franco’s funeral.
No doubt an advocate of reason in regard to military matters and tactics, and especially his war against terrorism, in his private life he followed a different course. He was a practicing Catholic, and believed he had a mandate from God to rule and change Chile, saving it from "Godless communism." In addition to this, Pinchoet engaged in mystical practices such as tarot cards and palm reading, claimed to have seen his father's soul rise from his body and believed in spiritualism.
Basically, he was an authoritarian military man who spent his whole life around military institutions. He was never in favor of the modernizing effects of modern capitalism, the breakdown of traditional ways and the pursuit of "individualism" in opposition to duty and patriotism. Contrary to popular belief, he was never a big supporter of America, despised Ronald Reagan, thought the American Congress was controlled by communists, and believed that only himself and General Franco were defeating communism.
A little known fact in the United States is that in the late 1970's Argentina and Chile were close to going to war over the Beagle Islands. Because of the Kennedy Amendment, United States was prohibited from selling arms to Chile. Facing an army much bigger than his own, Pinochet was infuriated with the United States for denying his country weapons when it faced imminent danger. According to Mary Helen Spooner the author of Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile, Pinochet was so angry with the American government he threatened the American embassador that he would seek support from the Russians.
If true, the anecdote would be a good measure at his anger with the United States. Pinochet hated communism and believed he had a mandate to save Chile for Christianity. He believed communists were "humanoids," a species beyond the normal, "diabolical" and "treacherous," geared to do anything to destroy the fatherland. Much of this anti-communist frenzy was backed up by the belief that this threat had to be exterminated and Chile returned to a country of Christian values backed up by duty and patriotism, and a strong military. But then who were the communists? It could be anyone who opposed the regime, thought differently—anyone with an individualistic style who didn’t subscribe to the authoritarian view of duty and obedience to a higher authority.
An excellent illustration of this type of mental orientation can be found in Isabel Allende’s book, My Invented Country. Allende, a distant relative of the former president, talks about the hysteria that reigned in Chile, much of it aimed at innocent and naive students who believed in some type of socialist utopia where a new type of freedom would reign. Much like the communist hysteria in the United States before it, anyone and everyone who had an individual way of doing things was considered suspect. Admitting that Salvador Allende made some grave mistakes and was naive about economic affairs during his short-lived administration, she concludes that when he was overthrown most of Chile, “hated him.”
While reports of what took place are cloudly, there was no doubt that left-wing forces were intent on duplicating Cuba in Chile, and opening up Latin America to a Marxist revolution. It was a divided country, falling into chaos and economic disarray, many on the left ignorant of the most basic economic principles and intent on establishing a socialist utopia with only their wishes and hopes to support them.
Most everyone agrees that when the coup took place it was supported by the vast majority of people. Allende had been chosen in a three-way election by a small margin. He was a democratically elected socialist but he never ran on a platform of a Marxist revolution, nor did he reveal to the population his plans for nationalizations and state control of the economy. His presidential campaign was full of platitudes about social justice and democratic control of the economy.
Ironically, in the early coup plans, Pinochet was left outside of the loop by the other military men. He was believed to be a loyal military man, loyal to his duty and to Allende. It was Allende who had appointed him as chief of staff of the army in the hope of forstalling military action even though other men, loyal to the government, were available. In one of those historical ironies of history both men had faced off against each other earlier in their careers. Allende believed Pinochet was an uneducated bumpkin "too unskilled to even deceive his own wife." Pinochet believed Allende was a traitor to his principles: a communist who loved women, liquor, fine clothes and the joys of night life.
After the coup, the Social Democrats and the conservatives all believed the military would return the country to civil rule and establish elections within six months. What they didn't count on was the deep-seated resentment of the Chilean military and their belief that they were treated like "dirt" by the political establishment. Pinochet, himself, despised politicians of all stripes and considered them charlatans and frauds. He had other plans for Chile and the fatherland, which he considered, "more important than family, the most important thing God gives to a man."
Once in power Pinochet showed a side of himself few had ever seen. He took control and slowly removed and eased out of power almost all the generals who had conspired with him. Anyone who posed a threat was sent packing and in some cases murdered. General Prats, who preceeded him as commander in chief, was murdered in Argentina and General Bonilla, one of his co-conspirators, died in a helicopter crash under very strange circumstances. Other generals like Gustavo Leigh, head of the air force and co-conspirator in the plot against Allende, were transfered or quietly retired into oblivion.
An internal intelligence agency called DINA was formed under Manuel Contreras, who was puritanical, messianical and violently anti-communist. Under the direction of Contreras, Communist Party members were murdered and tortured, but even more, anyone at anytime was subject to seizure and arrest. People were snatched off the street and were never seen again. There was no judicial review or overview. One's name could appear on a list, perhaps for political affiliation or perhaps for a resentment from someone in power, and this could mean torture and imprisonment.
More than anything, Pinochet was lord and master of the country and answered to no one. His regime, although economically very different, from Cuba, had a security apparatus similar to the Cuban dictatorship: repression of opposition, censorship, imprisonment without judical recourse—a one party regime that answered to no one with Pinochet at the top, pulling the strings. Ironically, Castro and Pinochet had met during Castro's month-long visit at the beginning of Allende's government. Pinochet served as Castro's escort. In his own words, Pinochet disliked Castro, who he considered a "big-mouth" who never stopped talking.
Nonetheless, although both men stemmed from different ideological postures, their pursuit of power was similar and their one-party rule replications of each other in crucial areas. In the end, both men rid themselves of anyone who challenged them—Pinochet disposing of Gustavo Leigh his main rival as well as Carlos Prats; and Castro, doing the same in Cuba, arresting and jailing Huber Matos for 20 years, one of his closest lieutenants and a comrade who triumphantly entered Havana at his side. Then, too, both men lost rivals in mysterious plane accidents, Camilo Cienfuegos, the charismatic and beloved revolutionary in Cuba, and General Bonilla in Chile. Many critics say, Che Guevara's ill-fated trip to Bolivia was a manipulation by Castro to rid himself of a potential rival who despised the Soviets, the same Soviets Castro was later to rely on as his saviors.
A good measure of the power of Pinochet was that most of the economic reforms taken by his regime were pushed through because everyone was afraid of him. Most of the high-ranking generals opposed market reforms, as did most of the protected businessmen, the Church, just about every institution of power in Chile. Such groups as the influential, ultra-nationalistic, Fatherland and Liberty, that wanted a nationalistic style economy lost out to the Chicago Boys, who were persuasive in their arguments for economic reform.
Thus, for the first time in history, the world witnessed a case of a country being forced to be economically free. Without any type of philosophical or moral foundation for the capitalist reforms, Pinochet's government went forward with economic reforms. There has been a lot of speculation about the Chicago Boys, and Pinochet's role in allowing them to make the changes. Most of the biographers of Pinochet speculate that he wanted to leave a legacy for Chile, something that would leave him a positive image for posterity. Initially, the military regime started out with military men as economic advisors, which proved to be a disaster. With his country on the brink of disarray, Pinochet was intelligent enough to know something had to be changed. The Chicago Boys got his attention—Sergio and Jaime Guzman—and the rest is history.
What one saw in Chile was probably unique in history--University of Chicago economists opening up the economy, while the secret service and the military imposed a repressive regime that censored newspapers, prohibited most opposition parties, intimidated government workers, and imposed an all-knowing security apparatus that gave Pinochet the confidence to boast that, “not a leaf moves in Chile without my knowing it.”
In the end, General Pinochet saved Chile from communism by imposing a military dictatorship for 17 years. Surprisingly, he gave up political power voluntary by submitting to a democratic referendum in which he was defeated by the opposition. He bowed to popular demand but he imposed himself as the head of the army, senator for life, and had his military men in all key positions.
Like many historical figures, he induced his own defeat by travelling to England, against the advice of his own counselors, and thus, once in prison, his invulnerability was exposed and his powers were slowly stripped away.
Chile today is governed by the Socialist Party and has been for over ten years. Thus, the dubious practice of instilling market reforms and capitalism under the guise of an authoritarian regime proves once again that Ayn Rand was right. Capitalism has to have a moral foundation to be appreciated and to succeed. Today, without this foundation and with Chile as the flag-ship example of economic success in Latin America, there is almost no talk of how this success was achieved, and the word capitalism in reference to Chile's success is rarely mentioned. The present president, Michelle Bachelet, described the economic success under Pinochet to “the modernization of the Chilean State.”
At one time, Pinochet was believed to be an “unselfish” warrior who saved Chile from disaster, but recent revelations prior to his death about million-dollar bank accounts in the United States, have tarnished his reputation. Even with this, at the time of his death, he commanded a loyal and committed following, and was especially popular amongst women of the older generation. Historically, Pinochet was another Latin American caudillo in line with Alfredo Stroessnner, Hugo Banzer, Jorge Videla and Leopoldo Galtieri, all contemporaries of his age. His legend and legacy will always be the rise of Chile to economic prominence and the contradiction between economic freedom and the repressive, one-party dictatorship of the Pinochet years.
References
María Eugenia Oyarzún, Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos Con Su Historia Conversaciones Inéditas Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, 1999
Augusto Pinochet, El Día Decisivo, Editorial Renacimiento, 1982
Mary Helen Spooner, Soldiers in a a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1994
Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet,
W. W. Norton & Company; New Ed edition (May 1993)
Isabel Allende, My Invented Country, Harper Row, 2003
Note: Salvador Allende was the uncle of the writer, Isabel Allende. Salvador Allende's daughter, is also named Isabel. She is a legislator presently serving in the Chilean congress.
Sunday, December 03, 2006
Tuesday, November 28, 2006
The New World of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías
A movie about the rise of Hugo Chavez to power could be titled, Son of Fidel Castro, or how a former army officer jailed for an attempted coup, rose to become president of his country, and later a world figure, under the mentorship of El Comandante in Havana and his army of ideologists.
While in America, one may see a scenario of boys growing up dreaming of owning their own businesses, becoming professionals, or perhaps quarterbacking an NFL team to the Super Bowl, more than a few boys in Latin America grow up immersed in radical politics and Marxist theory with dreams of becoming the savior of their country. If they are like Hugo Chávez, they feel rejected early in life, and humiliated by the power structure, impotent to rise above the disdain and snobbery of the elite classes of exclusion. Add to this scenario, a less than perfect home life lined with some heavy resentments and one can see a picture of a young boy intent on rising above his loneliness and separation, with a fierce desire to climb to the top.
Hugo Chávez is the second of six brothers, his father a humble teacher and his mother a reluctant mother, who followed the conventional path of marriage and family. At the age of four, Chávez and his brother Adán went to live with his grandmother because of economic problems at home. From this time, until he left for the military academy at 20, he lived with his grandmother, who according to the authors of Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme (Hugo Chávez Without Uniform), he thought of as his real mother. In this book, the authors speculate a relationship between his fiery character and what happened to him in boyhood—the development of a permanent aggressiveness stemming from the resentments of his childhood, most specifically his mother, who, at one time in his life, he refused to speak to for two years.1
A psychiatrist linked to the left and a former rector of the University Central of Venezuela, Edmundo Chirinos, became friends with Hugo Chávez after the failed coup of 1992, and began to counsel him in regard to personal problems. In Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme, he offers the opinion that Chávez feels genuinely snubbed and disrespected by the upperclass. He postulates that in Chávez’s character there is an evident bipolarity of closeness to the humble masses and rejection of the very powerful.2
As a boy, Hugo Chávez, in his own words, had two passions: drawing and baseball. He dreamed of playing in the major leagues. He worshipped the Venezuelan pitcher of that time, Isaías Latigo Chávez (no relation), who had a future in the American major leagues but was later killed in a plane crash. In this aspect, Chávez walked down the same path as his “big brother” in Cuba, Fidel Castro, who also had dreams of playing in the major leagues.
Later on, his dreams reached a more advanced level, possibly as a result of his widening consciousness of the world, and a chance meeting with the then president of Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez. From this chance meeting, he developed a mental grasp of the meaning of political power. In 1982, Chávez told his friend and military school companion, Federico Ruiz, that “some day I am going to be president of the Republic.” According to Ruiz, the words were said in a tone of perfect sobriety and seriousness.3
More than a few people have pointed out that Hugo Chávez is more of a lover of power than an ideologist, a Marxist, or even a socialist. He is reported to enjoy female companionship, expensive clothes and watches, luxurious accommodations and fancy cars. During the two coup attempts, in 1992 and 2002, when push came to shove, he chose life rather than the self-immolation of Allende, or the martyrdom of Guevara. In 2004, in the hands of his enemies and fearing that he would be murdered, he listened to the advice of Fidel Castro, who spoke to him by telephone, and survived to live another day.
People who know Chávez report that he had visions of power from an early age. Luis Miquilena was a former Minister of the Interior in Chavéz’s government and a one-time mentor, who resigned in 2002 because of disagreements with Chávez. It was Miquilena, a former communist, who was the driving force behind Chávez’s presidential campaign in 1998. Ironically, when Chavéz got out of jail in 1994, he lived in Miquilena’s house for five years, and was supported by him during one of the toughest times of his life.
In Cuentos Chinos, a book by Andrés Oppenheimer about Latin American politics, Miquilena provides a vision of Hugo Chávez and an analysis of his character now visible on the world stage. Miquilena refers to him as intellectually limited, impulsive, temperamental, surrounded by yes-men, incredibly disorganized in total aspects of his life ("intellectual minestrone in his head"), unpuntual, erratic, ignorant of financial matters and a lover of luxury.4
Another prominent Venezuelan in the leftist world, Teodoro Petkoff, a one-time ally of Chávez, has described him as a megalomanic, a lover of power and possessed of “authoritarian tendencies.” Petkoff is the editor of a daily newspaper called, Tal Cual, a former guerilla and the founder of the leftist party, MAS, Movement for Socialism.
“We’re suffering from the inefficiencies of a system manipulated by the megalomania and delirium of one man,” said Mr. Petkoff in a July 2006 interview with the New York Times. “Chávez thinks this country is his private ranch.” 5
Petkoff broke with the party he founded when it supported Chávez in 1998. He knew Chávez and believed that his authoritarian military temperament, his lack of knowledge of the country, and the naive nature of his fundamental concepts combined with a primitive leftism would “produce a disaster” for the country.
An experienced guerilla who spent time in prison in the nineties, Petkoff has been critical of the Venezuelan opposition to Chávez and sees the oil company strike as a major error, believing that the strikers had no exit strategy and only ended up delivering more power to Chávez. Petkoff has stressed that the opposition has not countered Chávez in a rational and goal-directed manner, and has concentrated too much on his personality, leaving themselves without a positive alternative to the socialism for the 21st century.
A one-time candidate for president in opposition to Chávez, Petkoff, 74, has thrown his support behind Manual Rosales as presidential candidate. He believes that it is wrong to label Chávez a dictator and a fascist as many in the opposition do, and that it does not benefit the program of the opposition to employ name-calling tactics in place of a workable program. He stresses the point that one must distinguish between a totalitarian regime and a caudillo-type of Latin American, strongman regime reminiscent of Chávez's government.
Another critic of Chávez, Raymundo Riva Palacio, who writes for El Universal of México one of that country’s major newspapers, calls Chávez a demogogue and a populist, a growing danger to those dispossessed people he offers to protect. He goes on to say that Chávez has neither the talent nor the span of Castro, nor his strategic objective, but that his petrodollars make him an extremely elevated risk for the stability of Latin America.7
Carlos Fuentes, the Méxican intellectual, another observer and critic of Chávez, has commented that Chávez "has attitudes of a tropical Mussolini."
In a November 2006 interview with the Agence France, Alan García, the president of Perú, referred to Chávez as intolerant, simplistic, bossy and opposed to the integration of Latin American countries. In referring to Chávez as simplistic, he spoke about Chávez's attempt to split Latin America in two, between those allied with the U.S., and those opposed. García went on to add that Chávez had no right to refer to leaders as traitors if they don't agree with him, referring to this attitude as intolerant.8
While the English-language media stresses the Bush administration’s opposition to Hugo Chávez, what is not well known is that much of the opposition to Chávez comes from people close to him, the Latin American left, and from politicians and countries describing themselves as socialist. Most of these countries, Chile, Perú and Uruguay are governed by self-described socialists intent on a democratic and constitutional path. Then, too, in contrast to the Bush administration, these are people highly experienced in the history of the politics of their hemisphere and less apt to fall for the rhetoric of another Latin American caudillo intent on fulfilling a messianic dream of unity and power in the southern hemisphere.
Socialism for the 21st Century
Richard Nixon, during his presidency, was quoted as saying, Latin America just didn't matter. Until recently this may have been true in regards to American diplomacy, but now with the arrival of Hugo Chávez that is changing. He lurks as an enormous, new figure on the world scene. Besides his oil resources, he is the major source of the Castroite, anti-liberal, anti-capitalist left, and now a transmission belt of Islamic fundamentalism into the Americas.
With his money he has started his own cable network, Telesur, has bailed out Argentina by buying large quantities of their debt bonds, is supporting candidates all over Latin America, and is offering to build refineries, pipelines and gas stations in countries like Panama and Costa Rica, all hard hit by rising oil prices. According to Latin American newspaper reports, he is involved in over 125 projects with the Iranians, including cement plants, tractor factories and housing projects in Venezuela. Recently, he has moved into supporting Marxist social organizations in Argentina and indigenous groups in Ecuador and Bolivia. The fiercely anti-American and pro-Castro, Piquetero leader in Argentina and ex-functionary of the Argentine government, Luis D’Elia, who is an ardent supporter of Iran, has visited Venezuela on many occasions, supporting the regime and its Iranian ally.
At this time, many opponents of Chávez refer to him as a dictator. One could define the characteristics of a dictatorship as: one party rule; summary executions, farce trials, censorship and expropriation of private property. Using this criteria, Venezuela still falls far short of a dictatorship. (As of November 2006). Harassing or threatening the opposition does not constitute a dictatorship. These things take place in many countries in Latin America. Reporters in Argentina regularly receive critical and threatening calls from the executive branch and the opposition has proof that their calls are being monitored. How many reporters in Mexico have been murdered? Even in Costa Rica, two reporters were recently murdered, and Costa Rica is supposedly the flagship country of "democratic" government in the hemisphere. Besides this, none of the reputable and major media outlets in Latin America refer to Chávez as a dictator, even in countries where he has a negative reputation.
More than anything, Chávez has gained ground so far by philosophical and ideological default. The main thrust of the opposition, which until recently lacked a powerful leader to counter Chávez's charisma, so far has been to attack Chávez, centering the fight on him. They have been hard pressed to find a positive strategy of their own, and with the money coming in from increased oil revenue, it is hard for them to counter his checkbook. (Gas costs a about 17 cents a gallon in Caracas and one can fill up a SUV for much less than five dollars.) Then, too, a part of the opposition is made up of the same elite groups that Venezuelans were so contemptuous of when voting Chávez into power: the so-called "oligarchy" known for their corruption and disdain for constitutional rule.
For the December elections of 2006, the opposition candidate Manual Rosales, the governor of the oil-rich state of Zulia, is striving to match Chávez’s social-justice platform, with a proposal for a minimum wage for all unemployed people and a debit-card program (la tarjeta negra, negra being a term of endearment) for poor people, who would receive monthly payments from oil revenues. Rosales is his own man, has criticized Chávez sharply for squandering money on domestic and foreign adventures, and is not afraid to campaign and appeal to lower-class neighborhoods, where previous opponents of Chávez were afraid to go. According to private polls Chávez has a comfortable lead in the race, but these polls could be misleading, and Rosales is confident of victory on December 3rd. The government has used many tactics of harassment against opposition voters, and there is fear of voter fraud during the election.
Even though, Rosales is his own man, he no doubt labors at a disadvantage. Chávez has the ideology and the ability to communate it in graphic details with slogans, colors and imagery. It is Chávez who sets the tone and shapes the issues. It is Chávez who has a national treasury at his disposal.
Without a doubt, Chávez is sitting in an enviable position. He controls all areas of the government—including the electoral power and the power for the defense of the people—almost an executive with unlimited powers. Chávez supported governors control 20 of the 23 provinces, and he has wide support amongst the military. Additionally, his brother runs the State oil company and the revenues from this company are used as an exclusive weapon of the party in power.
The only power he doesn’t control is the privately owned media, newspapers and television stations--very much a source of irritation to his regime. Along with this, there are opposition parties in Venezuela and an opposition media that readily criticizes him. There are no secret police arrests at three in the morning, nor are there summary executions. For the most part, opposition leaders are not jailed or tortured, and everybody is free to leave the country at will. There have been expropriations, mostly giant farms called latifundios, and non-functioning property of international companies such as the Heinz Corporation. Opposition leaders have been harassed and threatened. Without a doubt, his government is engaged in heavy-handed tactics--sometimes violent in nature--and his use of state money and power to advance his cause is out of control. No one is going to accuse him of advancing a society with constitutional guarantees and a strong system of checks and balances. Yet, all this falls short of dictatorship that is so imprinted in Latin American history--Castro's Cuba, Pinochet's Chile, Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay and of course, the military dictatorship in Argentine from 1976 to 1983, responsible for deaths and disappearances in the thousands.
For the most part, Chávez is accomplishing his revolution by the use of a social justice platform, "a new socialism under the precepts of Jesus Christ," powered by billions of petrodollars. His power base is supported by neighborhood missions where educational, medical and recreational benefits are distributed to the inhabitants. At these missions people can gain educational benefits, get medical attention for their children, buy food and medicine at reduced prices and receive instruction in different types of sports. News reports have estimated that 20,000 Cuban medical personal are operating in Venezuela, as well as many more teachers and sports trainers.1
Chavez—having schooled himself in Havana at Castro’s postgraduate course in acquiring state power—is building a new society in the name of altruism, a socialist revolution using the precepts of Christianity to build a new world where everyone will work together to build a more humane society. He is constantly attacking capitalism as selfish—“a system based on bloodsucking at a much higher level than Count Dracula.” Or a system that even leaves "Jack the Ripper coming up short." This, of course, coincides with attacks by the Catholic Church in Latin America that, at times, refers to "savage capitalism" as a system that calls into question the laws of God. Add to this, Chávez's calls to sacrifice oneself to defend Venezuela against the “Gringo” invasion--his militaristic nationalism--and one has another story of a charismatic leader using a social justice platform as a means to power and glory.
Ironically, in contradiction to what many envisioned for him, rather than following the same path of Fidel Castro and total state ownership of the economy, Chávez is following a path similar to Juan Perón—the often acclaimed Third Way between totalitarianism and classical liberalism. Perón was the champion of a national-socialist-style economy headed by a strong charismatic leader where the government controls major aspects of life but leaves most property in private hands. He was opposed to a liberal form of government and once said that freedom under liberal forms of government, “is the freedom to die from hunger.” Peron was also very critical of the United States and used the “gringos” as a convenient scapegoat in order to gather support for his regime.
One of the fundamental bedrocks of Peron’s philosophy was a call for social justice and a redistribution of wealth by means of state power. He saw the powerful state apparatus as a means to do this, and spent vast sums of money on social projects such as hospitals, health clinics, schools and community centers.
When he traveled to Argentina for the Conference of Americas in 2005, Chávez commented positively in regard to Perón and mentioned him as one of his heroes. Peron’s regimes were marked by a strong cult of personality and heavy state control of individual lives, yet his regime always fell short of being dictatorial. During his reign, opposition newspapers and parties criticized him, censorship was limited, people were free to leave, and no one was placed up against a wall and shot.
In opposition to the popular belief, Chávez’s association and alliance with Castro doesn’t mean he will follow a similar path as Castro. The fact that he refers to himself as a socialist—a socialism he claims his revolution will redefine—doesn’t mean he will follow the communist path of Castro and a complete regimentation of the economy, something that, now, in Latin America has little support or appeal.
In the book, Todo Chávez, by Eleazar Díaz Rangel, a book styled as an expanded interview with Hugo Chávez, the author refers to the failed socialist systems of the 20th century (statist economies, lack of individual freedom, disdain for the population), and asks Chávez in what way, his “new socialism” will be different. Chávez readily admits to the failures of the past experiments in socialism, and stresses that his socialism will be oriented toward the path of Christianity--brotherly love, solidarity and treating others with a sense of morality. He goes on to add that in his "new revolution" it will be necessary "to fight against the demons that are the foundation of capitalism: individualism, egoism, hate, privileges."
While in America, one may see a scenario of boys growing up dreaming of owning their own businesses, becoming professionals, or perhaps quarterbacking an NFL team to the Super Bowl, more than a few boys in Latin America grow up immersed in radical politics and Marxist theory with dreams of becoming the savior of their country. If they are like Hugo Chávez, they feel rejected early in life, and humiliated by the power structure, impotent to rise above the disdain and snobbery of the elite classes of exclusion. Add to this scenario, a less than perfect home life lined with some heavy resentments and one can see a picture of a young boy intent on rising above his loneliness and separation, with a fierce desire to climb to the top.
Hugo Chávez is the second of six brothers, his father a humble teacher and his mother a reluctant mother, who followed the conventional path of marriage and family. At the age of four, Chávez and his brother Adán went to live with his grandmother because of economic problems at home. From this time, until he left for the military academy at 20, he lived with his grandmother, who according to the authors of Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme (Hugo Chávez Without Uniform), he thought of as his real mother. In this book, the authors speculate a relationship between his fiery character and what happened to him in boyhood—the development of a permanent aggressiveness stemming from the resentments of his childhood, most specifically his mother, who, at one time in his life, he refused to speak to for two years.1
A psychiatrist linked to the left and a former rector of the University Central of Venezuela, Edmundo Chirinos, became friends with Hugo Chávez after the failed coup of 1992, and began to counsel him in regard to personal problems. In Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme, he offers the opinion that Chávez feels genuinely snubbed and disrespected by the upperclass. He postulates that in Chávez’s character there is an evident bipolarity of closeness to the humble masses and rejection of the very powerful.2
As a boy, Hugo Chávez, in his own words, had two passions: drawing and baseball. He dreamed of playing in the major leagues. He worshipped the Venezuelan pitcher of that time, Isaías Latigo Chávez (no relation), who had a future in the American major leagues but was later killed in a plane crash. In this aspect, Chávez walked down the same path as his “big brother” in Cuba, Fidel Castro, who also had dreams of playing in the major leagues.
Later on, his dreams reached a more advanced level, possibly as a result of his widening consciousness of the world, and a chance meeting with the then president of Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez. From this chance meeting, he developed a mental grasp of the meaning of political power. In 1982, Chávez told his friend and military school companion, Federico Ruiz, that “some day I am going to be president of the Republic.” According to Ruiz, the words were said in a tone of perfect sobriety and seriousness.3
More than a few people have pointed out that Hugo Chávez is more of a lover of power than an ideologist, a Marxist, or even a socialist. He is reported to enjoy female companionship, expensive clothes and watches, luxurious accommodations and fancy cars. During the two coup attempts, in 1992 and 2002, when push came to shove, he chose life rather than the self-immolation of Allende, or the martyrdom of Guevara. In 2004, in the hands of his enemies and fearing that he would be murdered, he listened to the advice of Fidel Castro, who spoke to him by telephone, and survived to live another day.
People who know Chávez report that he had visions of power from an early age. Luis Miquilena was a former Minister of the Interior in Chavéz’s government and a one-time mentor, who resigned in 2002 because of disagreements with Chávez. It was Miquilena, a former communist, who was the driving force behind Chávez’s presidential campaign in 1998. Ironically, when Chavéz got out of jail in 1994, he lived in Miquilena’s house for five years, and was supported by him during one of the toughest times of his life.
In Cuentos Chinos, a book by Andrés Oppenheimer about Latin American politics, Miquilena provides a vision of Hugo Chávez and an analysis of his character now visible on the world stage. Miquilena refers to him as intellectually limited, impulsive, temperamental, surrounded by yes-men, incredibly disorganized in total aspects of his life ("intellectual minestrone in his head"), unpuntual, erratic, ignorant of financial matters and a lover of luxury.4
Another prominent Venezuelan in the leftist world, Teodoro Petkoff, a one-time ally of Chávez, has described him as a megalomanic, a lover of power and possessed of “authoritarian tendencies.” Petkoff is the editor of a daily newspaper called, Tal Cual, a former guerilla and the founder of the leftist party, MAS, Movement for Socialism.
“We’re suffering from the inefficiencies of a system manipulated by the megalomania and delirium of one man,” said Mr. Petkoff in a July 2006 interview with the New York Times. “Chávez thinks this country is his private ranch.” 5
Petkoff broke with the party he founded when it supported Chávez in 1998. He knew Chávez and believed that his authoritarian military temperament, his lack of knowledge of the country, and the naive nature of his fundamental concepts combined with a primitive leftism would “produce a disaster” for the country.
An experienced guerilla who spent time in prison in the nineties, Petkoff has been critical of the Venezuelan opposition to Chávez and sees the oil company strike as a major error, believing that the strikers had no exit strategy and only ended up delivering more power to Chávez. Petkoff has stressed that the opposition has not countered Chávez in a rational and goal-directed manner, and has concentrated too much on his personality, leaving themselves without a positive alternative to the socialism for the 21st century.
A one-time candidate for president in opposition to Chávez, Petkoff, 74, has thrown his support behind Manual Rosales as presidential candidate. He believes that it is wrong to label Chávez a dictator and a fascist as many in the opposition do, and that it does not benefit the program of the opposition to employ name-calling tactics in place of a workable program. He stresses the point that one must distinguish between a totalitarian regime and a caudillo-type of Latin American, strongman regime reminiscent of Chávez's government.
Another critic of Chávez, Raymundo Riva Palacio, who writes for El Universal of México one of that country’s major newspapers, calls Chávez a demogogue and a populist, a growing danger to those dispossessed people he offers to protect. He goes on to say that Chávez has neither the talent nor the span of Castro, nor his strategic objective, but that his petrodollars make him an extremely elevated risk for the stability of Latin America.7
Carlos Fuentes, the Méxican intellectual, another observer and critic of Chávez, has commented that Chávez "has attitudes of a tropical Mussolini."
In a November 2006 interview with the Agence France, Alan García, the president of Perú, referred to Chávez as intolerant, simplistic, bossy and opposed to the integration of Latin American countries. In referring to Chávez as simplistic, he spoke about Chávez's attempt to split Latin America in two, between those allied with the U.S., and those opposed. García went on to add that Chávez had no right to refer to leaders as traitors if they don't agree with him, referring to this attitude as intolerant.8
While the English-language media stresses the Bush administration’s opposition to Hugo Chávez, what is not well known is that much of the opposition to Chávez comes from people close to him, the Latin American left, and from politicians and countries describing themselves as socialist. Most of these countries, Chile, Perú and Uruguay are governed by self-described socialists intent on a democratic and constitutional path. Then, too, in contrast to the Bush administration, these are people highly experienced in the history of the politics of their hemisphere and less apt to fall for the rhetoric of another Latin American caudillo intent on fulfilling a messianic dream of unity and power in the southern hemisphere.
Socialism for the 21st Century
Richard Nixon, during his presidency, was quoted as saying, Latin America just didn't matter. Until recently this may have been true in regards to American diplomacy, but now with the arrival of Hugo Chávez that is changing. He lurks as an enormous, new figure on the world scene. Besides his oil resources, he is the major source of the Castroite, anti-liberal, anti-capitalist left, and now a transmission belt of Islamic fundamentalism into the Americas.
With his money he has started his own cable network, Telesur, has bailed out Argentina by buying large quantities of their debt bonds, is supporting candidates all over Latin America, and is offering to build refineries, pipelines and gas stations in countries like Panama and Costa Rica, all hard hit by rising oil prices. According to Latin American newspaper reports, he is involved in over 125 projects with the Iranians, including cement plants, tractor factories and housing projects in Venezuela. Recently, he has moved into supporting Marxist social organizations in Argentina and indigenous groups in Ecuador and Bolivia. The fiercely anti-American and pro-Castro, Piquetero leader in Argentina and ex-functionary of the Argentine government, Luis D’Elia, who is an ardent supporter of Iran, has visited Venezuela on many occasions, supporting the regime and its Iranian ally.
At this time, many opponents of Chávez refer to him as a dictator. One could define the characteristics of a dictatorship as: one party rule; summary executions, farce trials, censorship and expropriation of private property. Using this criteria, Venezuela still falls far short of a dictatorship. (As of November 2006). Harassing or threatening the opposition does not constitute a dictatorship. These things take place in many countries in Latin America. Reporters in Argentina regularly receive critical and threatening calls from the executive branch and the opposition has proof that their calls are being monitored. How many reporters in Mexico have been murdered? Even in Costa Rica, two reporters were recently murdered, and Costa Rica is supposedly the flagship country of "democratic" government in the hemisphere. Besides this, none of the reputable and major media outlets in Latin America refer to Chávez as a dictator, even in countries where he has a negative reputation.
More than anything, Chávez has gained ground so far by philosophical and ideological default. The main thrust of the opposition, which until recently lacked a powerful leader to counter Chávez's charisma, so far has been to attack Chávez, centering the fight on him. They have been hard pressed to find a positive strategy of their own, and with the money coming in from increased oil revenue, it is hard for them to counter his checkbook. (Gas costs a about 17 cents a gallon in Caracas and one can fill up a SUV for much less than five dollars.) Then, too, a part of the opposition is made up of the same elite groups that Venezuelans were so contemptuous of when voting Chávez into power: the so-called "oligarchy" known for their corruption and disdain for constitutional rule.
For the December elections of 2006, the opposition candidate Manual Rosales, the governor of the oil-rich state of Zulia, is striving to match Chávez’s social-justice platform, with a proposal for a minimum wage for all unemployed people and a debit-card program (la tarjeta negra, negra being a term of endearment) for poor people, who would receive monthly payments from oil revenues. Rosales is his own man, has criticized Chávez sharply for squandering money on domestic and foreign adventures, and is not afraid to campaign and appeal to lower-class neighborhoods, where previous opponents of Chávez were afraid to go. According to private polls Chávez has a comfortable lead in the race, but these polls could be misleading, and Rosales is confident of victory on December 3rd. The government has used many tactics of harassment against opposition voters, and there is fear of voter fraud during the election.
Even though, Rosales is his own man, he no doubt labors at a disadvantage. Chávez has the ideology and the ability to communate it in graphic details with slogans, colors and imagery. It is Chávez who sets the tone and shapes the issues. It is Chávez who has a national treasury at his disposal.
Without a doubt, Chávez is sitting in an enviable position. He controls all areas of the government—including the electoral power and the power for the defense of the people—almost an executive with unlimited powers. Chávez supported governors control 20 of the 23 provinces, and he has wide support amongst the military. Additionally, his brother runs the State oil company and the revenues from this company are used as an exclusive weapon of the party in power.
The only power he doesn’t control is the privately owned media, newspapers and television stations--very much a source of irritation to his regime. Along with this, there are opposition parties in Venezuela and an opposition media that readily criticizes him. There are no secret police arrests at three in the morning, nor are there summary executions. For the most part, opposition leaders are not jailed or tortured, and everybody is free to leave the country at will. There have been expropriations, mostly giant farms called latifundios, and non-functioning property of international companies such as the Heinz Corporation. Opposition leaders have been harassed and threatened. Without a doubt, his government is engaged in heavy-handed tactics--sometimes violent in nature--and his use of state money and power to advance his cause is out of control. No one is going to accuse him of advancing a society with constitutional guarantees and a strong system of checks and balances. Yet, all this falls short of dictatorship that is so imprinted in Latin American history--Castro's Cuba, Pinochet's Chile, Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay and of course, the military dictatorship in Argentine from 1976 to 1983, responsible for deaths and disappearances in the thousands.
For the most part, Chávez is accomplishing his revolution by the use of a social justice platform, "a new socialism under the precepts of Jesus Christ," powered by billions of petrodollars. His power base is supported by neighborhood missions where educational, medical and recreational benefits are distributed to the inhabitants. At these missions people can gain educational benefits, get medical attention for their children, buy food and medicine at reduced prices and receive instruction in different types of sports. News reports have estimated that 20,000 Cuban medical personal are operating in Venezuela, as well as many more teachers and sports trainers.1
Chavez—having schooled himself in Havana at Castro’s postgraduate course in acquiring state power—is building a new society in the name of altruism, a socialist revolution using the precepts of Christianity to build a new world where everyone will work together to build a more humane society. He is constantly attacking capitalism as selfish—“a system based on bloodsucking at a much higher level than Count Dracula.” Or a system that even leaves "Jack the Ripper coming up short." This, of course, coincides with attacks by the Catholic Church in Latin America that, at times, refers to "savage capitalism" as a system that calls into question the laws of God. Add to this, Chávez's calls to sacrifice oneself to defend Venezuela against the “Gringo” invasion--his militaristic nationalism--and one has another story of a charismatic leader using a social justice platform as a means to power and glory.
Ironically, in contradiction to what many envisioned for him, rather than following the same path of Fidel Castro and total state ownership of the economy, Chávez is following a path similar to Juan Perón—the often acclaimed Third Way between totalitarianism and classical liberalism. Perón was the champion of a national-socialist-style economy headed by a strong charismatic leader where the government controls major aspects of life but leaves most property in private hands. He was opposed to a liberal form of government and once said that freedom under liberal forms of government, “is the freedom to die from hunger.” Peron was also very critical of the United States and used the “gringos” as a convenient scapegoat in order to gather support for his regime.
One of the fundamental bedrocks of Peron’s philosophy was a call for social justice and a redistribution of wealth by means of state power. He saw the powerful state apparatus as a means to do this, and spent vast sums of money on social projects such as hospitals, health clinics, schools and community centers.
When he traveled to Argentina for the Conference of Americas in 2005, Chávez commented positively in regard to Perón and mentioned him as one of his heroes. Peron’s regimes were marked by a strong cult of personality and heavy state control of individual lives, yet his regime always fell short of being dictatorial. During his reign, opposition newspapers and parties criticized him, censorship was limited, people were free to leave, and no one was placed up against a wall and shot.
In opposition to the popular belief, Chávez’s association and alliance with Castro doesn’t mean he will follow a similar path as Castro. The fact that he refers to himself as a socialist—a socialism he claims his revolution will redefine—doesn’t mean he will follow the communist path of Castro and a complete regimentation of the economy, something that, now, in Latin America has little support or appeal.
In the book, Todo Chávez, by Eleazar Díaz Rangel, a book styled as an expanded interview with Hugo Chávez, the author refers to the failed socialist systems of the 20th century (statist economies, lack of individual freedom, disdain for the population), and asks Chávez in what way, his “new socialism” will be different. Chávez readily admits to the failures of the past experiments in socialism, and stresses that his socialism will be oriented toward the path of Christianity--brotherly love, solidarity and treating others with a sense of morality. He goes on to add that in his "new revolution" it will be necessary "to fight against the demons that are the foundation of capitalism: individualism, egoism, hate, privileges."
In the interview, Chávez denies that there are any plans to rid Venezuela of private property. "We are not planning a socialist revolution to eliminate private property." He cites as an example China’s motto of “one country, two systems.” Chávez goes on to stress that Venezuela must define its “new socialism.” Without a doubt, he says things will be different in Venezuela, and that the country is on a different path.
In this regard, and as a backdrop to his “new socialism” one should remember that Hugo Chávez arrived to power as a dark horse. He was elected overwhelmingly as a crusader against the corrupt forces in power in Venezuela, the so-called "oligarchy" made up of the elitist elements of government, the corrupt bishops of the Church, the protected businesses of privilege, and the distant upper classes, which tended to disdain and ignore the plight of the lower classes. This populist touch of his and his ability to reach out to the "humble masses" is one of his great strengths. He knows how to appeal to their fears, resentments and hopes for the future. His talk of a "new socialism" is nothing more than the appeal to the dream of the lower classes to be included in the future of the country--their aspirations for a better future. While the old conservative classes ignored and even disdained the great mass of people from the lower level, Hugo Chávez speaks to them from a lifetime of experience.
An example of this is a speech he gave in front of a group of public university students, one of whom complained about the lack of equipment and poor transportation they had at their public university. Chávez responded to the female student by criticizing the "capitalism" of private universities, where "the only interest is to make money and where it has nothing to do with quality education." He went on say they that the government planned to construct 17 new technical colleges and eight other general universities, and that the students "had to train themselves to serve the revolution." 2 (El Universal, Pedro Pablo Peñaloza, 2006/11/06/ "Chávez lanza en Punto Fijo la Misión Alma Mater")
To people and especially to young people who are excluded from the opportunities of society this is a powerful and intoxicating message. It speaks to their hopes and dreams, and their desires for a place in the world above the grinding poverty of the lower classes. This is the power of his message, a message wrapped up in a package with a socialist ideology at its very core. Yet, to the hungry masses the slight of hand manipulation of his ideology is lost in the promises of a better life all wrapped up in an attractive package deal.
There is no doubt that the message of Hugo Chávez involves a strong messianic appeal to the longings and deep-seated dreams of the dispossessed masses of Venezuela, a message that could eventually mean another failed revolution dying at the feet of the hopes and dreams of the lower classes. In this sense, many true socialists in Latin America have classified Chávez as a powerluster—a fraudulent socialist—using socialism as a ruse to gain adherents and followers. If this is so, Chávez would not be the first to use social-justice rhetoric in order to advance his agenda of personal power. Socialism has a long history in Latin America and has failed in every country in which it has been tried, from Juan Velasco Alvarado and Alan Garcia in Peru, to Victor Paz Estensoro in Bolivia, to Allende in Chile, to the most prominent example, Castro’s Cuba and its new Marxist man, dedicated to serving the revolution on ten dollars a month.
Yet, the failure of socialism in the past has not destroyed the ideal of building a new socialist society of the future, a society of peace and harmony in Latin America. The dream of Che Guevara’s better world is still alive and is in harmony with the altruistic teachings of the Catholic Church, and its call for an unselfish society. Socialism speaks about a moral ideal, while capitalism is, often, associated with selfish and individualistic pursuits, seen by most people as amoral or immoral. Then, too, there is almost a complete lack of knowledge and support about what capitalism is and how it works in Latin America. Along with this, in Latin America, the fundamentals of capitalism are beyond the reach of most people. Bank loans, stock market investments, the legal creation of small businesses, career advancement, and legal protection of private property and titles are absent, for all, but a privileged few.
In Latin America, capitalists are often seen as part of the privileged elite, an elite closed off to the rest of the population. Access to this world is often restricted or blocked. Then, too, many in the elites just don't want anyone to have access to their privileged club. Along with this is the philosophic barrage from the left, the incessant unanswered propaganda against free markets, neo-liberalism, and savage or predatory capitalism as it is so-often called south of the border. Their message, and it is often a very strong one, is that capitalism is the problem, the very root of everyone's poverty and misery. Of course, corrupted and half-hearted attempts at opening up markets while stealing half the national treasury all under the name of neo-liberalism or capitalism, as occurred in Argentina and other countries, give the Marxists all the intellectual fuel they need to slander the concept
Thus, once again, we see another attempt at the “noble experiment,” a new, unselfish society in Venezuela where everyone will work together in order to produce the common good. Reading the English-language media, one would have to think the country was on the verge of a great, revolutionary leap forward into a new world. Yet, one wonders in what way Hugo Chávez will succeed when all the other experiments in socialism have failed? Of course, the media fails to ask this question, as if to ask it, would require a peak into the dark past and a lurch into an even darker future.
The Latin American Left
During the inaugeration of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías in February of 1999, a diverse mixture of Latin American politicians were in attendance. Hugo Banzer, the ex-Bolivian dictator turned democratic politician was there as was Alberto Fujimori, the Peruvian president. Although Fujimori and his right-hand man, Vladimero Montesinos had a good relationship with the United States, there was also a special connection to the regime in Venezuela. After the failed attempted coup of 1992, many of the Venezuelan military fled to Peru under the protection of Montesinos. Many years later, when Montesinos fled Peru and went into hiding, he wound up in Caracas under the protection of Hugo Chávez, who later claimed that he captured him and turned him over to the Peruvians. When the Peruvians learned that Montesinos was hiding in Caracas rather than being captured there, newspapers all over Lima ran headlines proclaiming that Chávez was a “payaso” or clown. This led to a diplomatic crisis and eventually both countries withdrew their ambassadors. Such are the interwoven relationships of Latin American political affairs, often transgressing party lines.
Also in attendance at Chávez’s inauguration was Fidel Castro, a sign of the special relationship that was developing between the two men. When Chávez was released from prison in 1994, Castro extended a hand of welcome and a reception in Havana. He praised his election in 1999 as a great step for democracy and called Chávez a great champion of liberty. When Chávez was overthrown during a two-day coup, it was Castro who counseled him by phone not to “self-immolate” like Allende and to surrender to the events so that he could live another day.
Chávez is very much part of the Latin American, Castro-inspired left that has as its moral ideal the ex-guerrilla leader Che Guevara. Guevara is often portrayed as the heroic example of self-sacrifice and service to others, a noble crusader, who wanted nothing for himself, fighting against the selfish and savage capitalists who want to dominate the world and enslave the worker. In many Latin American countries, his image as a romantic and heroic revolutionary willing to fight to his death to bring about his better world is a symbol of a heroic and noble ideal to be followed toward a better world.
To add to the image, Guevara is held out as the apex of self-sacrifice and service to others, a genuine man of his word who was willing to give his life for the revolution. The fact that Robert Redford, Gail Garcia and Bernicio del Toro make movies of him in Latin America, and that others in Hollywood support this effort, adds to his legend. In Latin America, he becomes a magnet for the young and rebellious who want to fight the often corrupt societies they live in. These young people are told that Guevara is a carbon copy of Jesus, a true revolutionary who fought for a better world where people will happily serve their fellow man as they work toward a collective society of equality and abundance. Having little in the way of people to look up to, many young people, especially the most idealistic, often see in Guevara a symbol of a better world.
In regard to Che Guevara, as with Fidel Castro, one has a metaphysical question of what is reality, and how much public relations and a supportive media, especially Hollywood, can distort and cover over the real picture. To help manufacture this image, Castro's State apparatus constantly recruits and charms potential allies, especially artists, writers, musicians, journalists and teachers. The state apparatus invites artists to Havana, charms them, treats them as special, and no doubt favors them with money and other artistic opportunities. In Latin America, any number of prominent writers are allied with the Cuban regime, including best-selling author, Gabriel García Márquez and noble-prize winner José Saramago. Americans friendly to Castro include Oliver Stone, Robert Redford, Harry Belafonte and Danny Glover. Diego Maradona, the Argentine ex-soccer superstar, known and loved by millions in Latin America, is a devotee of Castro and wears a tatoo of Che Guevarra on his right bicep as well as one of Castro on his lower leg.
What this accomplishes is to give sanction to the Cuban state as a humane organization and bolster Castro's claim that he is fighting for a better world free of capitalistic selfishness. If humanistic and openly creative artistic types are patrons of Castro, the question goes, how bad can he really be?
Even more, Castro, over the years, has prevailed and this adds to his legend. Castro is philosophical and ideological, and he knows his enemies will never fight him on these grounds. He speaks often of hating individualism and selfishness and has compared his plight with that of Jesus, talking often about the similarities between Christianity and communism. It is not a random happening that Hugo Chávez recently came out in the open, and proclaimed himself a Christian socialist.
While Guevara is gone and while Castro now hovers in he twilight zone of the past, his protégé and little brother, Hugo Chávez, is very much alive and dreaming of the future and his new revolution.
The Bush Punching Bag
Hugo Chávez, the day after the November 2006 elections in the United States, referred to the results as a "paliza" for the "truly savage" goverment of Bush. The word "paliza" would interpret as a beating or a thrashing of severe dimensions. The use of the this word is psychologically revealing as to the way Chávez has used the less-than-astute Bush administration, and more specifically, George W. Bush as his ready-made psychological punching bag.
In October of 2006, in Teodoro Petkoff’s newspaper Tal Cual, Hugo Chávez is quoted as saying George Bush has no idea of what politics is about. A close ally of Chávez, the former presidential candidate in Ecuador, Rafael Correa, was quoted in the press as referring to Bush as "tremendously dimwitted." Evo Morales, another ally of Chávez, has also joined the parade, reigning down epithets on Bush and demeaning his ability and intelligence. Diego Maradona has referred to Bush as a “murderer” and “human garbage.”
Along with this, even more moderate presidents such as Alan García of Perú, Michelle Bachelet and Vicente Fox of México have commented in negative tones on the abilities of the commander-in-chief of the United States.
At the 2005 Conference of Americas in Argentina, that took place the first week of November, George Bush sat quietly and listened to the president of Argentina, the host of the Conference, blame America for doing a great deal of damage to Latin America. He said nothing in his defence and previously had commended the president for improving Argentina’s economy. He also made a reference to Manu Ginóbili, the Argentine NBA basketball player, as a way of ingratiating himself to his hosts. During the Conference, Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and the superfamous soccer star, Diego Maradona, noted for his friendship with Fidel Castro, vilified George Bush, insulting his intelligence and referring to him as the world's premier terrorist. Chávez alluded to him as the devil, an alcoholic and an incompetent. Later on, with riots breaking out and with over 50 private businesses being trashed in Mar de Plata, Bush quietly exited the country as if nothing had ever happened. He made no comments to the press on the bashing that took place in Argentina, and very little appeared in the American press.
Hugo Chávez, on the contrary, had a field day. He trashed the president of the United States as if he was a vagabond stealing candy out of a supermarket. He referred to him as Mr. Danger, called him an alcoholic and disparaged his intelligence. He also made a telling psychological reference to the five musketeers (Chávez, Morales, Kirchner, Lula and Maradona) with their swords at a high position, winning the duel against Mr. Danger. He drew a picture of a great battle against the Empire and against Bush, and maintained that his forces won a historic battle.
Here are some of the quotes of Hugo Chávez that appeared in the Spanish-language press.
"The Empire wanted to put us on our knees and beat us. But no, he (Bush) left beaten."
"From the conference I take away the taste of victory, the taste of the sweetness (honey) of victory. The defeated one was Bush. He left in silence with his tail between his legs."
"The man (Bush) left beaten. Didn't you see his face? The great loser was Mr. George "the Devil" Bush and because of that he left in a hurry." He said this in the company of his smiling ministers in the lobby of the luxurious Hotel Republica.
"In the history of South America one will have to speak in the future of before Mar de Plata and after Mar de Plata. Yesterday, occurred an event, a historic and unrepeatable event that marks the new road, the new history for the people of the south. The ALCA is dead."
Meanwhile, in the English-language media this "historic event" was never reported as such nor did the sharp words of Chávez ever see print. Only months later, at the U.N., did his reference to Bush as "the Devil" become public knowledge.
It is psychologically revealing how much contempt the left has for Bush's intelligence and ability and what this means for the future of the United States in Latin America. It is one thing to be anti-American and collectivist in one's approach to the world, but this position does not necessarily mean contempt for the ability of the leader of the United States, something that was generally absent during the Clinton administration. Now however, one sees an additional component to the traditionally hostile and anti-American attitude of the Latin American far left.
This tactic of using America as a scapegoat is a familiar one in Latin America and Chávez is a skilled tactician of this method. As an example of this, in November 2006 on the campaign trail, he told his followers that “that the American Empire would never return to enslave Venezuala” and that the country was now free, and would remain free under his revolution of the people.
As practiced by the Castroite left in Latin America, one crucial element of ideological strategy is to always have an enemy, a scapegoat, a punching bag readily available as an outlet for any type of internal frustration, and as a means of gathering a cohesive base for one’s goals and purposes. United States and capitalism have been a long-standing scapegoat of Castro as well as the fundamental structures that support them egoism and individualism. With the arrival of George Bush to the presidency, another dimension was added: a ready made and willing punching bag, who apparently would do most of the work himself.
Fidel Castro has successfully employed this tactic for close to 50 years. Yet, never has there been a target so readily available to disparage himself and his country as George Bush. He is the dream of every person who wants to destroy the American dream, a perfect target who readily complies and colludes with his enemies, providing them with all the ammunition anyone could ask for. Hugo Chávez has a ready made intellectual punching bag who never defends himself, no matter how much or how bad, the accusations appear. While in the United States, Chavéz's remarks get little play, they are heard all over Latin America. Day after day, the former paratrooper attacks the most powerful man and country in the world, and there is never a response. Newspapers all over Latin America carry his attacks, and many of them make front-page headlines. More than anything, this tactic puts him on the front page, and increases his stature and popularity before millions of people who feel powerless and excluded from life, and looking for a leader to take them to the promised land.
It is ironic that George Bush, the son of a former president who has attended some of America's best schools, falls prey to the former "golpista" and paratrooper from the Venezuelan lower classes. One would think that a graduate of one of America's premier universities would be able to dance around the former paratrooper and one-time prisoner. Apparently, beyond the surface, there is some type of ancient class-war resentment in effect here, far beyond the boundaries of socialism and the so-called capitalism of the United States. Perhaps more than an anti-American and anti-capitalist rhetoric, what we see from Hugo Chávez is a deep-seated resentment of George Bush because he is the child of the upper class, supposedly a well-bred patrician born with a golden spoon in his mouth, while on the contrary, Chávez has risen to the top by his own wits and ability.
To go along with this, media observers have pointed out that one of Chávez’s major weaknesses is his lack of intellectual preparation and his inability to match wits with other leaders in Latin America. Once one gets past the glib outer surface of Hugo Chávez, there is a different story to the public image. During the Peruvian elections of 2006, he clashed with Alan Garcia, president elect of Peru, and was soundly thrashed by Garcia, a formidable communicator, writer and intellectual. Alejandro Toledo, the former Peruvian president and graduate of Stanford University, also clashed with Chávez and has referred to him in less than complimentary terms. Michelle Bachelet, the Chilean president and herself a medical doctor, who has studied in both the United States and Europe, has distanced her government from Chávez. Vincente Fox, the ex-Mexican president and himself an accomplished businessman, clashed with Chávez during the Conference of the Americas in Argentina in 2005. Intellectuals such as Andres Oppenheimer, Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Carlos Alberto Montaner have all written negatively about the ability and tactics of Chávez and his attempt to become another Latin American caudillo.
After Chávez’s display of questionable behavior at the United Nations, Teodoro Petkoff described his tactics as that of a "chabacano" or someone acting cheaply, crudely or tastelessly. Whether he does this intentionally or whether it stems from defects in his personality is open to question. Whatever the case, while appearing tasteless and cheap in the world arena of international politics and in the media in the United States, Chávez's carnival atmosphere of orchestrated acts of "chabacano" is always directed at a low-level audience only to happy to see the rich and powerful under attack. At times, his intellectual range seems to be limited to referring to his opponents as fascist, and attacking savage capitalism. Yet, strategically, Chávez is acting as the crusading Robin Hood slaying the powerful and the mighty without hesitation or fear. To the powerless and disaffected masses in Latin America this has a strong attraction, and affords them an outlet for their great anger and frustration at being left out of life.
Hugo Chávez, so far, has found himself in a very favorable position in regard to the fate of world events, especially with the Iraq War and escalating oil prices that has provided him with a war treasury far beyond his wildest expectations. Yet, nothing he has done has been as favorable as having George W. Bush as his scapegoat, a ready made and available punching bag for everything that is bad and wrong with the world.
The Socialist New Frontier
Hugo Chávez, unlike some of the other socialist crusaders—especially his mentor in Cuba— is sitting on a unique situation never seen before in Latin America. With the war in Iraq and the sky-high rise in oil prices, Chávez has billions of dollars of oil revenues to spend on social programs in Venezuela, and on foreign policy interference in other governments in Latin America. Imagine how history would have changed if Fidel Castro—considered to be intellectually and strategically superior to Chávez by most observers—had access to billions of dollars of oil money in order to export his collectivist revolution?
How exactly he will accomplish his revolution is still open to speculation. Along with the use of his enormous wealth to win friends and influence people, one of Chávez’s main goals is to use the military as an instrument of social change. In this sense, he is borrowing from a book that influenced him in military school, a book by Claude Heller about the process of using the army as an agent of social development and change. This along with his community programs such as the circles based on his hero, Bolivar, that are apparent in many communities will form a bedrock of support for his revolution.
Ironically, and very much to the core of American foreign policy problems, the major portion of these revenues, that Chávez is using to further his revolution, comes from the United States. Here again, one sees the sacrificial and suicidal foreign policy of the United States coming back to haunt the country, perhaps a repeat of the whole Castro fiasco that has lasted, now, for almost 50 years.
With his petrodollars, Chávez has established his own cable television network in Latin America that has a working relationship with the Arab network Al-Jazeeri. He has invested heavily in Argentina, with both gas stations and by bailing out the government of Nestor Kirchner by buying their debt bonds owed to the IMF. He is keeping Cuba afloat with billions of dollars of oil shipments in exchange for Cuban doctors, sports advisors and military personal. In Bolivia, it was rumored that he helped to finance Evo Morales’ presidential campaign and is now providing monetary and military assistance. These same reports were numerous in regard to the presidential campaigns of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.
In October of 2006, both the Bolivian and Venezuelan government announced the establishment of 21 new military bases in Bolivia on the frontier with neighboring countries, Chile, Brazil Perú and Paraguay. Already, the Venezuelan military is in charge of security for Evo Morales and is reported to be training elements of the Bolivian army. .
During the Conference of Americas in 2005, Chávez revealed a plan to build an oil pipeline from Venezuela to Argentina that would pass through Brazil. Elaborate models and sketches were released to the media, and Chávez—much like a profit-seeking capitalist who he continually rails against—walked around hailing the great benefits of this state-run entrepreneurial project. Critics, however, speculate that the estimated $70 trillion dollar project will never see the light of day and the project is more of Chávez’s megalomania that is being tolerated by his allies in Mercosur as a response to his tremendous oil wealth.
The "regaladera," or the policy of using Venezuelan oil money as means of bestowing gifts on foreign countries is a controversial issue in Venezuela. In 2006, Chávez made a tour of Central America and the Caribbean offering to sell oil to these countries at reduced prices. In Panamá and Costa Rica, he talked about the possibility of building refineries, and to sell them oil at a cheaper price than Mexico. He is selling heating oil to poor neighborhoods in the United States at reduced prices. There is talk of a refinery for Vietnam, a road for Jamaica, projects with Ecuador.
He defends these "regaladera" programs as part of his socialist revolution, a way of showing solidarity with the poor nations of the world. Those familiar with the morality that underlies socialism would simply reply that he is following a social-justice course, an altruistic road lined with unselfishness, where Venezuela's wealth and resources are placed in service to her neighbors.
In the fall of 2006, Chávez started his campaign for the Latin American seat on the United Nations’ Security Council. He traveled all over the world strengthening his ties with the Arab world and courting China and Russia, where he signed billion-dollar agreements to buy arms for the Venezuelan Army.
At the U.N. in October, Chávez made his famous speech where he referred to George Bush as the “Devil.” Later on, he suffered an unexpected defeat in losing every vote for the Latin American U.N. seat to the Security Council to Guatemala. Apparently, his U.N. theatrics had backfired, just as his interference in the Peruvian elections had backfired against his friend Ollanta Humala; and just as his theatrics had hurt his favored candidate in the Mexican election.
Yet, Chávez took these defeats in stride and soon experienced successes in Nicaragua and Ecuador, when his favored candidates, Daniel Ortega and Rafael Correa won election victories for the presidency. In late October after Fidel Castro appeared on CNN looking lost and bewildered, Chávez rushed to his defence, maintaining that he was making a quick recovery and would soon be his old self. Chávez told the news reporters that Castro was an "uncontrollable dirty old man" who goes crazy in front of the stewardesses on his private jet. Without any concern of how this would play in feminist circles in Europe or the United States, he referred to Castro as an "atacón" or a womanizer, no doubt saying all this as a way of lifting his mentor's fading spirits by alluding to his virility. Much more than an ideological partnership, the relationship speaks of a male bonding experience, and the omnipresent need amongst males for support in a hostile world.
As of late November 2006, Chávez is preparing for the elections in Venezuela that will take place December 3rd. As of now, Chávez is far ahead in the polling and is reported to be heading for an electoral win. With his ideological approach to politics and his overstuffed wallet, he is in an enviable position. Able to throw money at the electorate, at this time, he has little need to use state power in order to achieve his goals. One can only speculate where he would be at this time, without the enormous sources of money pouring into Venezuela.
In a speech in early November in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, in front of workers for his state-run oil company, Chávez stated he would cut off all supplies to the United States--"not even a drop"-- if the "Empire" and its "lackys" in Venezuela didn't stop trying to undermine his regime, a threat he has made several times before. He went on to add that the oil company (PDVA) is a "revolutionary institution" and the workers will be expected to support the regime and the revolution in the election in early December. Predictably, this threat to cut the oil supply and the attempt to make PDVA a revolutionary institution never saw the light of day in the English-language press.
In early November, Transparency International, issued its 2006 report on the status of corruption amongst the countries of the world. Venezuela rated out as one of the most corrupt countries in Latin America, tied with Ecuador for the position number 238, while Chile rated out at position 20 as the least corrupt country in the hemisphere.
Thus, the revolution goes forward in Venezuela, perhaps a tainted and corrupt revolution but a revolution nonetheless. The government’s control over the individual and the economy becomes more extensive as Chávez's executive power goes unchecked. His ability to spend money without congressional oversight or judicial review puts him in a unique position. He is a virtual monarch with pots of gold at his disposal to be spent at his discretion.
The "Socialist with Money" has a two-barreled shotgun—the petrodollars pouring in and his social-justice approach to politics. Not only does he have the weapons but he knows the general ideological approach he wants to pursue. The ideological coaching he received under the auspices of Fidel Castro will serve him well in the future, if his "megalomania" doesn't bring down the house of cards before it fully develops. With this knowledge under his belt, he expresses a confidence in his approach to the world which gives him an advantage over his non-ideological opponents, who basically center their attack on Chávez, and not the ideological issues of individual freedom versus an all-powerful, welfare state.
The Wall Street Journal Americas had an article a few years ago emphasizing the pragmatism of Hugo Chávez. They pointed out that he wasn't taking a strict ideological approach but was pragmatically doing business with the United States, selling the major portion of his oil to the Empire to the north. The problem with this definition is that it overlooks the fundamental approach of his regime. The fact that he does business with the United States does not necessarily make him a pragmatist, but perhaps just a leader taking strategic steps along a guided ideological course.
Political ideology is nothing more than a guided course that follows along the path of philosophical ideas. His stated goal of socialism for the 21st century can follow many routes, but fundamentally it is based on collectivism and altruism: State control of large portions of the economy and individual self-sacrifice and service to others are the foundation of this new society. Everything he has done so far has followed along this ideologically line, and will likely be same in the future.
Without a hint of doubt, Chávez is openly supportive of an ideological approach to politics. He has been quoted as saying that education must be ideological because it is about ideas. His Education Minister has offered a similar viewpoint. In a news report that appeared in La Prensa of Panamá (October 29, 2006) he said, "Each teacher has to be married to the model. Our political ideology has as an objective the construction of the ideology of socialism for the 21st century,
In this sense, Chávez and his team are following an ideological map heading for a certain direction. In contrast, their opposition, not only in Venezuela but in the United States, is groping in the dark, reacting to Chávez rather than promulgating their own philosophy. Here, one sees all the signs of a pragmatic approach to politics, a short-range projection of goals and an absence of cohesive ideas that would lead them toward a productive future.
The prime example of this would be the the Bush Administration. It seems to have little idea on how to deal with Chávez, their strategy absent of a long-range philosophy, mired in pragmatic, range-of-the-moment decisions ignoring the big picture. What is more, like many American administrations before them, they seem to be contemptuous of philosophy and political ideology, disdainful of the need to communicate ideas and geared to a foreign policy of appeasement and supporting some nebulous idea of democracy, without defining exactly what this idea is.
In this way, in the face of a pragmatic and floundering opposition, Hugo Chávez has a great advantage philosophically and ideologically. Much more than a “tropical Mussolini” or another Latin American strongman, he is a social-justice crusader heading down a direct path. While the journey along the trail may be chaotic and filled with range-of-the-moment whimsical effusions of megalomania and the intoxication of power, the light at the end of the tunnel is always shining brightly—a new socialist world of equality and brotherly love where all Venezuelans will work together under the fatherly and benevolent concern of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías.
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In the elections of December 2006, Chávez prevailed with just shy of 63% of the vote, including all the states of Venezuela, something he had never done in the three previous elections. This win gave the appearance to the world of a robust and functioning democracy and, himself, as a popular and beloved leader. In many ways, the government of Chávez is following the road of the Peruvian government of the nineties, headed by Alberto Fujimori and Vladimero Montesinos, often referred to by the press as a “democratic dictatorship.” In this regime, state power and influence were used overtly and covertly so as to give the appearance of a democratic government while the reality, under the surface, was a much different story. Under the surface, opposition legislators were brought off or blackmailed, newspapers were manipulated and stories planted, the intelligence service harassed opposition leaders, and money and favors were accorded to those friendly to the regime.
The word democracy has a wide and varied meaning. It can include a constitutional government with legal rights and checks and balances to off-set executive power as well as chaotic governments where some type of election is held while the executive rules with unrestricted will or power. In many countries, especially in Latin America, government support derives from large client bases made up of government workers and monopoly unions. In other countries, political leaders spring up overnight with their own parties, at times gathering a vast following in a short time with mystical appeals to a new society based on a sweeping out of office the corrupt leaders of the past.
Surely, this was the path to power of Hugo Chávez. He sprang to fame after his failed coup, when he was put on television to appeal for a surrender of his followers and became a national celebrity by proclaiming that “for now his forces were surrendering.” He later went on to political fame by attacking the corrupt elites and appealing to the poverty of the masses. Yet, his appeals to social justice and his new socialist society, are nothing new and are no excuse for the accumulation and abuse of power, and his manipulation of the country as if it was “his private ranch.” This is not a new society, a new revolution, but a simple return to the iron man, caudillo rule of the Banana Republics of the past.
Without a defined constitutional guide to control his actions and no opposition in the legislature, Chávez will have six more years of free reign to impose his goals on the country. He has spoken about a law allowing indefinite reelection of the president and a referendum to strip the opposition television stations of their licenses. With the government totally in his hands, he has access to a vast world of patronage, and can hire and fire people at will. The future of his government, no doubt, points to a greater consolidation of state power and an executive branch free to act at will, constrained, perhaps, only by his image of himself as the leader of a free and democratic Venezuela
Yet, the key to the whole Chávez structure is the vast amount of oil revenue at his disposal. With this money, he can solidify his social programs and fortify his voter base by doling out enormous sums of money. Strip Chávez of his petrodollar base and force him to rely on his socialism of the 21st century without its capitalist foundation, and his revolution will be nothing more than sandcastles in the sky, a house of cards with no foundation, and no economic base in which to build: a façade of words, created and supported by the very things he attacks—the petrodollars of the advanced semi-capitalist world.
No doubt in the future, the house of cards will collapse, and a time will come when the Chávez government will have to choose between staying in power and its image as a free, democratic society. If the price of oil collapses, this process will occur rapidly. Yet, when push comes to shove, the intoxicating allure of power, without billions in petrodollars, will prove the reality of the Chávez government and his claims to a “new socialism” and a new society based on Christian love.
Thursday, October 19, 2006
Juan Domingo Perón: The General Lives
Around the middle of October 2006, Juan Domingo Perón’s remains were transferred to a million-dollar mausoleum built for him in a small town outside of Buenos Aires. During the ceremonies for this event which would commemorate the 17th of October uprising of workers that freed Perón in 1945, violence broke out between rival Peronist factions. A man wtih a pistol was filmed by news crews shooting into a building. Newspapers reported 60 injuries and perhaps a few gunshot wounds. As is common with political violence in Argentina, the police were slow and reluctant to intervene.
The president of Argentina, Nelson Kirchner, himself a Peronist, cancelled his appearance and never arrived at the scene. Eduardo Duhalde, another prominent Peronist, former president and archenemy of the president, greeted supporters at a different location but did not appear at the mausoleum. However, other prominent Peronists did show up as did thousands of loyal supports of the General, whose memory is still very much alive amongst not only the media, but amongst those who still support him.
The movement of Peron’s remains was accompanied by a claim by a woman who says she is Perón’s daughter. The Argentine judiciary has processed the claim and samples of the General’s DNA were taken in order to establish proof. Peron had no natural children by his three wives, including the famous Eva Duarte, and the less famous María Estela Martínez de Perón, commonly known as Isabel. In the year 2006, Isabel is still alive and living in Spain. She is the one that gave permission for his body to be moved.
The violence at the mausoleum of Perón, sparked memories of his return from exile in 1972 after 17 years of living outside the country that, at one time, he dominated in heart and soul. At that time, thousands of his supporters gathered at Ezeiza Airport to greet him. Violence and gunplay broke out between rival Peronist factions. Scores of people were killed and injured, and Peron's plane was diverted to another airport, an inauspicious beginning for his return to power. .
That in the year 2006 the news of Perón’s body being moved—over 30 years after his death—could grab front-page headlines in Buenos Aires and appear in papers throughout the world is testament to the power of the General and the Peronist movement that still rules Argentine politics. The history and legacy of Juan Domingo Perón, primarily a phenomenon of the forties and fifties, provides an interesting perspective to present-day political philosophy. Perón known throughout Latin America for his third alternative or third way between capitalism and communism—or between classical liberalism and totalitarian collectivism—thought he had the natural solution to the Cold War battles between United States and Russia. He sought to correct what he saw as the inhuman aspects of the marketplace and the crushing aspects of Russian totalitarianism. Thinking that Argentina was a colony of British imperialism, Perón sought to make Argentina independent of foreign economic interests and believed that economic liberalism was nothing more than jungle anarchy. Commenting during the forties on economic liberalism, he defined liberty, "As the freedom to die from hunger." His wife Evita believed that capitalism was an unpatriotic system, "a system without a flag or fatherland." A key Peronist slogan for many years was: "Neither Marxism or capitalism."
The General Rises
The rise of Perón to power is not an unfamiliar story in Latin America. He grew up under humble circumstances, his father a farmer of Irish descent and his mother reported to be of Spanish and Indian roots. There were uncorroborated rumors, stemming from research by the author Tomas Eloy Martinez,. that Perón was born out of wedlock, a fact that could have severely hindered his political career.
Intelligent and quite amiable, Perón worked his way rapidly through the Argentine military system. He was ambitious and charismatic, and seemed to have a vision of where he wanted to go. At that time, during the thirties, the Argentine military and many of the high-ranking generals were influenced by the fascism engulfing Europe. The president of Argentina during the thirties, José Félix Uriburu was an ardent admirer of the European fascists as were many of his advisors.
Influenced by the intellectual breeding ground he lived in, Perón was a believer in the powerful and benevolent state controlling and directing social and economic affairs. Much of his political philosophy was influenced by Mussolini and his Doctrine of Fascism, where he extols the virtues of an all-powerful state and defines the evils of liberalism and individualism. Having spent a year in Italy and other parts of Europe at the behest of his superiors—ordered to report on the power and influence of Germany and Italy and their chances of triumphing against the allied powers—Perón had a chance to study El Duce and was said to admire him a great deal by his own word and that of his biographers. Mainly, his admiration centered on the early years of Mussolini’s rise to power, his ability to communicate a philosophical program as well as his emphasis on a powerful state as the guiding hand in all affairs, especially the economy. Perón never subscribed to the violent aspects of Mussolini’s fascism, the will to power and the desire for conquest as an expression of the national will to dominate others.
In the United States, the image of Perón is often tarnished by allegations of fascism or fascist sympathies. The fact that Argentina had a history of fascist associations prior to Perón and stayed neutral during the war only adds to this myth. Articles and books have appeared alleging his collusion with Nazi Germany, and later on with Nazi war criminals like Adolf Eichmann. An American government publication after the War, published by the then American ambassador, Spruille Braden, alleged that Perón aided the Axis cause. However, in defence of Perón, many of the charges in the publication were of dubious sources and seemed more a work of revenge than of scholarship given the fact that Perón and Braden were enemies.
Although no doubt influenced by Mussolini and Francisco Franco, Perón had his own political philosophy called Justicialismo. He could not be labeled a fascist, nor did he subscribe to the philosophical fundamentals of the fascist state—an all-powerful entity, totalitarian in nature and imposing fully on and dominating the life of the individual citizen—a domination that required service and self-sacrifice at all costs and the loss of individual autonomy. (In this sense, the word fascist is used to describe the original word coined by Mussolini to describe his ideology, as outlined in The Doctrine of Fascism. It is in no way used in the modern sense, as someone advocating racism, violence and brutality in order to achieve political means.)
Perón was never an advocate of war and the will to power so dominant in Mussolini's concept of fascism, nor did he believe in racial superiority or ever express anti-Jewish sentiments. On the whole, he was a cultured and educated advocate of the power of Justicialismo, his ideology of a benevolent state that would liberate the individual from economic want. In fact, much of his program was aimed toward liberating the individual from "economic slavery" that he saw as the dominating points of both capitalism and communism.
In the book, The Philosophy of Peronism, Perón has this to say about the totalitarianism of both fascism and communism: "It (totalitarianism) doesn't recognize in this manner the personality of man, his '"I,"' which makes him a person; in the final instance it denies his spirit, a position that is fundamental to the personality." He goes on to say: "In both forms, (fascism and communism) the liberty of man, that is part of his spirit, is absolutely unrecognized and the human being is converted into a slave of the State, in detriment of oneself and of the collective."
While independent in nature, Perón borrowed from the dominant philosophies of the world. In The Philosophy of Perón, he compares the great ideas of the world with his ideas for a Peronist State, and points out how his government will avoid the extreme collectivism of communism which "kills all incentive in the individual," and what he calls the "anarchy of capitalism" with its "heartless disregard for the underclass and its reliance on egoist self-interest at the expense of humanitarian concerns." (El capitalism es una fuerza de agloneración fría, internacional, sin patria y sin corazon." pg 125 Philosophy of Peron.)
Perhaps one could describe Juan Domingo Perón as a cultured and ideological caudillo or strongman, a charismatic man with a political vision for a country lost and on the brink of chaos. Surely, the ingredients for a rise to power were apparent in his personality—another talented and intelligent boy from the lower classes eager to work his way to the top. In the United States, these stories are legendary. In Argentina, also a country of immigrants, the rise to the top is blocked by barricades of institutionalized arrogance and aristocratic snobbery of the kind that rejects talent and ability in the name of one's bloodline. Many ambitious young people fall by the wayside; few will even try.
Joseph Page, a lawyer who taught at the University of Maryland, wrote a definitive biography of Perón published in English and available in Spanish translation. In his book, he rejects the fascist label in regards to his life, and also rejects the train of thought that Perón was sympathetic to Nazi criminals and harbored them in Argentina. Just like with the United States, Perón recruited many Nazi scientists in order to bolster science and technology in Argentina, thinking his new revolution would be a showplace of modern scientific development and technology. Page, also, rejects any comparison between Juan Perón and Hugo Chávez, stating that Perón was a cultured man, a student of history and philosophy. Chávez has his petrodollars.
Another biographer of Perón, Horacio Váquez-Rial who wrote a Spanish-language biography of him, also rejects the fascist label for Perón, who was a cultured and well-read man, disliked violence, allowed an opposition to exist and built his Peronist state around strong state-controlled unions and a benevolent welfare state. In contrast to the rigid and cold authoritarian personality engendered by fascism, Perón was a warm and intelligent man with tremendous confidence in his conception of the world.
In her book, Peron’s Women, Andrea Bellota points out that Perón had a great affinity for women, needed a woman in his life and had a great love for Evita, and some of the other women in his life. After the death of Evita, he had a young girl, Nellie Rivas, living at his house, an act of good will in where he acted as a father to a young girl who adored him. Accused by his enemies of "estupro" or undermining the morals of a minor, Nellie Rivas had only admirable things to say about the "General" calling him a perfect gentleman, someone who helped her advance in life without taking advantage of her in any way. At that time, it was believed Perón had no children of his own.
Unlike religious conservatives and fascist ideologies, that tend to relegate women to raising children and cooking, Perón respected the women in his life and relied deeply on them to advance his political agenda. One of the most crucial components of Perón’s power was his wife Eva Duarte, a powerful speaker who had a deep-rooted and binding relationship with the so-called shirtless people, the disenfranchised and powerless masses who were at the mercy of the conservative and elite classes of privilege and power.
They were an excellent team. Peron was the intelligence and the philosophy behind the revolution; Evita the emotion, the gut, the mystical chanteuse of the Argentine masses. The tone of her voice, filled with pain and emotion, had a hypnotic effect on large crowds. She spoke the language of the dispossessed and she spoke from hard experience. Although possessed of fine tastes and superior appetites, she had a binding link with the anonymous masses, the focal point of Peron’s political philosophy.
When I was in Buenos Aires in 2005, I spent an afternoon at the Institute of Perón, watching the documentary by Leonardo Flavio called: Perón: Symphony of a Feeling. What struck me more than anything was the charismatic power of both the General and Evita Perón. They radiated charisma, a feeling that seemed to engulf the crowd. Evita was even more magnetic. This was much more than a political act. It was a deep-seated pain, agony and affinity manifesting in political discourse.
When Evita died in 1952, many of the writers familiar with Peron, speculate that he lost much of the desire to continue his revolution. He retreated more to his private residence and seemed to lack the spark and vigor of previous times.
Tomas Eloy Martinez, the author of the The Novel of Perón and The Lives of the General is another author who paints a real-life portrait of Perón that goes much beyond the cheap myths and stereotypes one hears in the media. Of special interest is his The Novel of Perón set in 1973 the year of Perón's return to Argentina after 17 years in exile. In this book, one sees a diminished Perón absent his great powers, sick and close to death, surrounded by palace vultures ready to exploit the General's weakness, drunk with power lust and the thought of being at the top of the ladder of
Other authors who knew Perón talk about his great charm and intelligence, often winning over people with the power of his personality, captivating them with his intelligence and charisma. He was very much a man of philosophy and ideas, and was never reluctant to offer his point of view to doubters. In watching documentaries of him in action and giving speeches, I was struck by the great certainty of his demeanor, the intellectual certainty of great man. However, as with all great people, the General had his weaknesses. Felix Luna, a renowned Argentine historian and writer, describes Perón as a fabulador, or one given to create or make up stories. Luna goes on to say that Perón lived in his own world and perhaps never realized some of the consequences of his actions.
Once in power, Perón and Evita spent large sums of money on public works projects, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, schools and sports centers. They established a department of education, made education compulsory between six and fourteen, and built universities in all parts of Argentina. In many ways, Peron’s regime was similar to Roosevelt’s New Deal, a benevolent welfare state aimed at social justice and redistribution of wealth.
As part of his program for economic independence, Perón nationalized the central bank, the train lines, the telephone company, the gas companies and electric transmission facilities. He built a modern airport, dams, chemical plants, introduced atomic energy, strived to build fighter planes and even had plans to produce Argentine cars.
Although hostile to the liberalism and the freedom of the American economy, Perón was not hostile to capital per se, only to the fact that he saw American businessmen as too independent, to able to establish their own agenda. He saw this as economic anarchy and sought to impose state control in order to further a spirit of cooperation. Thus, businessmen who advanced under Perón were those who gained benefits from the State—protection and favors, or monopoly positions in the marketplace. Independent union leaders under Perón were replaced by those loyal to him, which was very much in line with his intention of having the unions always under control of the State. The unions were to be favored but never independent of the benefactor state.
Remaining neutral during World War II, Argentina was able to sell its grains and beef to foreign markets and gather huge reserves of currency for the future. However, by the late forties and early fifties with the return of normalcy and having exhausted his reserves on public spending, his government saw itself strapped for cash and looking for foreign investment. In addition, Argentine industry, controlled and weighted down by union rules and heavily protected by the State, could not compete in the world market.
It was at this juncture that Perón altered his extreme view of economic nationalism and his somewhat hostile view of American economic activity, often labeled promiscuously as capitalism, and invited American companies to invest in Argentina. Milton Eisenhower, the brother of the president, visited Argentina and was wined and dined. A controversial agreement was signed with Standard Oil of California, and they were given free reign to explore and develop in areas of Argentina. .
One of the most conflictive situations of the Perón regime was the battle with Catholic Church, which tended to resent the competition of Perón’s youth groups and his popularity amongst the working class. All of this culminated in 1955 with an open battle between the Church and the Peronist Party. Peron responded by legalizing divorce, stripping the Church of its privileged educational position in schools, arresting Catholic clergyman, legalizing brothels, and passing a law that gave full citizenship to children born out of wedlock.
Church opposition to Peron’s regime grew. In 1955, the navy tried to kill Peron by bombarding the Plaza del Mayo and the presidential palace, but only managed to kill between 200 and 400 private citizens. Later in 1955, the military rebelled again and Perón fled to Paraguay under the protection of Alfredo Stroessner, the Paraguayan dictator. He was to live in exile for 17 years.
The Finale and his Legacy
On the day that Perón returned from exile, there was a shootout at the airport between different Peronist factions, and reports have the injures and deaths in scores of people. In 1974 he was again elected president by an overwhelming margin and within eight months he was dead. He wife Isabel Peron, an ex-dancer who he met in exile in Panamá, became president, and Perón’s ex-private secretary, a man named Jose López Rega, nicknamed "The Sorcerer" because of his love for the occult and witchcraft, became the de facto president.
Perhaps near the end of his life, Perón was too sick to realize the consequences of his actions. Most writers and intellectuals in Argentina recognize his decision to post his wife as vice president as a horrendous error that was to have dire consequences for the future of Argentina. An ex-dancer with no political experience, knowledge or talent in this area, her time in office was notable for indecision and incompetence. Not having the knowledge of what to do, she relegated most power to Jose López Rega, a mystical witch doctor of power, who responded with state-sanctioned violence and murder to quell the violence of the communist left.
Under Isabel and López Rega, Argentina fell into a cycle of violence and economic disarray. Lopez Vega was reported to be the head of an anti-communist death squad called the Triple AAA. This death squad was formed to counter the left-wing violence at the hands of the Montoneros, a socialist Catholic group intent on violent revolution, and the even more violent ERP, a Maoist group convinced that violent revolution was the only path to a new Argentina.
Isabel Perón and López Rega lasted less than two years, as chaos, violence, political murders and assassinations as well as economic disaster became everyday occurrences. In 1976, Peron’s wife was overthrown by a military junta. She fled to Spain, where she lives to this day. The military dictatorship ruled Argentina until 1983.
Today, Perón’s influence is still very much alive in Latin America, and in other parts of the world. The Third Way philosophy of Perón is apparent everywhere, from the mixed economy of United States to the deluted communism of China. None other than Hugo Chavéz mentioned Peròn as one of his heroes, and has used the analogy of the third alternative or the third way between savage capitalism and totalitarianism. Even though rarely admitted to all the economies in Latin America are a mixture between heavy state ownership and regulation, privileged businessman, large government sponsored unions and benevolent welfare-state programs that seek to establish "social justice," one of Perón's favorite concepts. As in Perón's time, the Church, the intellectuals, the media, the conservatives and the radical left are all hostile to liberalism, and its emphasis on dismantling state influence.
Perón sought a benevolent welfare state with the big unions as his power base in order to further his concept of social justice. He ran three times as a candidate, and was elected three times by large margins. In a sense, he was the democratic man par excellence, a marvelous manipulator of mass psychology and opinion.
Joseph Page, in his biography, compares him to Hughie Long, the ex-governor of Louisiana, who was a democratic phenomenon in his time and a bridge between the elite conservative forces of the old South and the Marxist theories of the state that were being propagated in the universities and intellectual circles of America in the thirties.
The word often used to describe these men is populist in that they had a pulse on the heartbeat of their turf, and often followed programs catering to popular wants and desires rather than what reality required in order to develop the economy.
Perón had little knowledge of economic consequences and took a huge war-time surplus and spent it on his pet projects. He was like a patriarch catering to his flock, bestowing presents and dreams on them, in order to reward them for their good behavior and adherence to his message. He is like the utopian visionary who seeks to establish heaven on earth but has no conception of how to accomplish it. Yet, when the money is flowing and the gold is in the pot, all is well with the world, and the king marches to his own band.
In the late sixties and seventies, several left-wing groups sympathetic to Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and communism adopted Peron as their own and sought to use his name to advance their ideas of a Marxist state. One of these groups was the Montoneros, composed of socialist Catholics, who believed in the armed struggle to a Marxist state. The Montoneros were famous for kidnapping and murdering the ex-president of Argentina, Pedro Aramburu. (Peron objected to them)
In addition to this, John William Cooke, Perón’s heir apparent, was an admirer of Castro’s communist revolution and wanted to combine these ideas with his conception of Peronism. However, Perón himself, although sympathetic to national socialism, was not an admirer of the Marxist version, and definitely saw communism as a blight to the working man. In fact, during the Cold War, many people in the American State Department, saw Perón as a counterweight to communism in South America, and urged support for his government.
Perón's legacy is as important today as it was during the forties and fifties. The names and faces change but if one looks, one can see the mark of Juan Domingo Perón all over Latin America and in the rest of the world, including the United States. In Argentina, the Peronist Party has an overwhelming influence on the Argentina’s political life, although without Perón at the helm, it seems to lack a direction or cohesion.
The present president of Argentina, Nelson Kirchner, is from the Peronist party, although from the left wing of the party. Yet, this notwithstanding, he follows the same Peronist prescription of heavy government control of the economy and a disdain for unfettered market transactions and trade. Kirchner harbors an anti-American attitude and has aligned himself with Hugo Chávez, although he follows a much more discreet path. Carlos Menen, the ex-president, was also from the Peronist Party, although from the right wing. He had a good relationship with the United States, sometimes referred to as "carnal." During his presidency, the market was opened up as was the channels of corruption.
Although associated with Fidel Castro and the socialism of Cuba, Hugo Chávez has mentioned Juan Perón favorably on many occasions and enjoys a close relationship with the present Peronist president. Ironically, rather than following the strict Marxist ideology of Castro, Chávez has traveled down a path much more reminiscent of Juan Perón: heavy state control and regulation while most small businesses remain in private hands.
In other parts of Latin America, the influence of Perón is still very noticeable. Economic nationalism is rampant south of the border, and Perón’s admonition of "vendepatria" or selling out the fatherland to foreign interests in still common. Evo Morales, another admirer of Castro, has been an advocate of this train of thought, the belief that "our national resources" must belong to the Bolivians, and administered by the State.
Even in Costa Rica, which has strongly liberalized its economy in recent years, the influence of Perón can be seen. The giant insurance and electric monopolies are state owned and the argument against privatizing them is that they must belong to Costa Rica, and to do otherwise is unpatriotic, or another instance of "vendepatria."
If one looks close enough one sees this same Peronist phenomenon with Ollanta Humala in Perú and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, both men advocates of economic nationalism and the belief that foreign investment or influence in the economy is destructive to national interests.
In the United States, the third way between a genuine free market absent of government control and totalitarianism is very apparent. The role of the benevolent State in all affairs of life is enormous and probably extends way beyond anything reached by Perón. Ironically, the country often castigated for being the home of savage capitalism is now the home of the largest and most efficient state apparatus the world has ever seen.
So the legacy of Juan Domingo Perón lives on. To the dispossessed of Latin America, ideology has little meaning. Only the knowledge that someone is willing to help them has any relevance. For the wide, democratic mass of people, struggling to keep their head above water, the only question is how much a leader like Peron can do for them and that he is speaking about changing their lives.
Surely, Juan Domingo Perón still walks along the shadows of Latin American history, the spirit and power behind the dispossessed of the world. They are all looking for that soothing lotion or narcotic voice that will lessen their burden and make them feel like they are part of something, and like Perón, the present crop of leaders offer alternatives to the corrosive corruption, arrogance and instability of the chaotic democracies that inhabit this part of the world. With someone like Perón at their side to do their fighting, the displaced and hopeless "descamisados" of despair can, at least in their dreams, rise above the loneliness and isolation of people without hope or future: the forlorn masses condemned to another night of screaming into the wilderness or into the dark hole of poverty and despair.
The president of Argentina, Nelson Kirchner, himself a Peronist, cancelled his appearance and never arrived at the scene. Eduardo Duhalde, another prominent Peronist, former president and archenemy of the president, greeted supporters at a different location but did not appear at the mausoleum. However, other prominent Peronists did show up as did thousands of loyal supports of the General, whose memory is still very much alive amongst not only the media, but amongst those who still support him.
The movement of Peron’s remains was accompanied by a claim by a woman who says she is Perón’s daughter. The Argentine judiciary has processed the claim and samples of the General’s DNA were taken in order to establish proof. Peron had no natural children by his three wives, including the famous Eva Duarte, and the less famous María Estela Martínez de Perón, commonly known as Isabel. In the year 2006, Isabel is still alive and living in Spain. She is the one that gave permission for his body to be moved.
The violence at the mausoleum of Perón, sparked memories of his return from exile in 1972 after 17 years of living outside the country that, at one time, he dominated in heart and soul. At that time, thousands of his supporters gathered at Ezeiza Airport to greet him. Violence and gunplay broke out between rival Peronist factions. Scores of people were killed and injured, and Peron's plane was diverted to another airport, an inauspicious beginning for his return to power. .
That in the year 2006 the news of Perón’s body being moved—over 30 years after his death—could grab front-page headlines in Buenos Aires and appear in papers throughout the world is testament to the power of the General and the Peronist movement that still rules Argentine politics. The history and legacy of Juan Domingo Perón, primarily a phenomenon of the forties and fifties, provides an interesting perspective to present-day political philosophy. Perón known throughout Latin America for his third alternative or third way between capitalism and communism—or between classical liberalism and totalitarian collectivism—thought he had the natural solution to the Cold War battles between United States and Russia. He sought to correct what he saw as the inhuman aspects of the marketplace and the crushing aspects of Russian totalitarianism. Thinking that Argentina was a colony of British imperialism, Perón sought to make Argentina independent of foreign economic interests and believed that economic liberalism was nothing more than jungle anarchy. Commenting during the forties on economic liberalism, he defined liberty, "As the freedom to die from hunger." His wife Evita believed that capitalism was an unpatriotic system, "a system without a flag or fatherland." A key Peronist slogan for many years was: "Neither Marxism or capitalism."
The General Rises
The rise of Perón to power is not an unfamiliar story in Latin America. He grew up under humble circumstances, his father a farmer of Irish descent and his mother reported to be of Spanish and Indian roots. There were uncorroborated rumors, stemming from research by the author Tomas Eloy Martinez,. that Perón was born out of wedlock, a fact that could have severely hindered his political career.
Intelligent and quite amiable, Perón worked his way rapidly through the Argentine military system. He was ambitious and charismatic, and seemed to have a vision of where he wanted to go. At that time, during the thirties, the Argentine military and many of the high-ranking generals were influenced by the fascism engulfing Europe. The president of Argentina during the thirties, José Félix Uriburu was an ardent admirer of the European fascists as were many of his advisors.
Influenced by the intellectual breeding ground he lived in, Perón was a believer in the powerful and benevolent state controlling and directing social and economic affairs. Much of his political philosophy was influenced by Mussolini and his Doctrine of Fascism, where he extols the virtues of an all-powerful state and defines the evils of liberalism and individualism. Having spent a year in Italy and other parts of Europe at the behest of his superiors—ordered to report on the power and influence of Germany and Italy and their chances of triumphing against the allied powers—Perón had a chance to study El Duce and was said to admire him a great deal by his own word and that of his biographers. Mainly, his admiration centered on the early years of Mussolini’s rise to power, his ability to communicate a philosophical program as well as his emphasis on a powerful state as the guiding hand in all affairs, especially the economy. Perón never subscribed to the violent aspects of Mussolini’s fascism, the will to power and the desire for conquest as an expression of the national will to dominate others.
In the United States, the image of Perón is often tarnished by allegations of fascism or fascist sympathies. The fact that Argentina had a history of fascist associations prior to Perón and stayed neutral during the war only adds to this myth. Articles and books have appeared alleging his collusion with Nazi Germany, and later on with Nazi war criminals like Adolf Eichmann. An American government publication after the War, published by the then American ambassador, Spruille Braden, alleged that Perón aided the Axis cause. However, in defence of Perón, many of the charges in the publication were of dubious sources and seemed more a work of revenge than of scholarship given the fact that Perón and Braden were enemies.
Although no doubt influenced by Mussolini and Francisco Franco, Perón had his own political philosophy called Justicialismo. He could not be labeled a fascist, nor did he subscribe to the philosophical fundamentals of the fascist state—an all-powerful entity, totalitarian in nature and imposing fully on and dominating the life of the individual citizen—a domination that required service and self-sacrifice at all costs and the loss of individual autonomy. (In this sense, the word fascist is used to describe the original word coined by Mussolini to describe his ideology, as outlined in The Doctrine of Fascism. It is in no way used in the modern sense, as someone advocating racism, violence and brutality in order to achieve political means.)
Perón was never an advocate of war and the will to power so dominant in Mussolini's concept of fascism, nor did he believe in racial superiority or ever express anti-Jewish sentiments. On the whole, he was a cultured and educated advocate of the power of Justicialismo, his ideology of a benevolent state that would liberate the individual from economic want. In fact, much of his program was aimed toward liberating the individual from "economic slavery" that he saw as the dominating points of both capitalism and communism.
In the book, The Philosophy of Peronism, Perón has this to say about the totalitarianism of both fascism and communism: "It (totalitarianism) doesn't recognize in this manner the personality of man, his '"I,"' which makes him a person; in the final instance it denies his spirit, a position that is fundamental to the personality." He goes on to say: "In both forms, (fascism and communism) the liberty of man, that is part of his spirit, is absolutely unrecognized and the human being is converted into a slave of the State, in detriment of oneself and of the collective."
While independent in nature, Perón borrowed from the dominant philosophies of the world. In The Philosophy of Perón, he compares the great ideas of the world with his ideas for a Peronist State, and points out how his government will avoid the extreme collectivism of communism which "kills all incentive in the individual," and what he calls the "anarchy of capitalism" with its "heartless disregard for the underclass and its reliance on egoist self-interest at the expense of humanitarian concerns." (El capitalism es una fuerza de agloneración fría, internacional, sin patria y sin corazon." pg 125 Philosophy of Peron.)
Perhaps one could describe Juan Domingo Perón as a cultured and ideological caudillo or strongman, a charismatic man with a political vision for a country lost and on the brink of chaos. Surely, the ingredients for a rise to power were apparent in his personality—another talented and intelligent boy from the lower classes eager to work his way to the top. In the United States, these stories are legendary. In Argentina, also a country of immigrants, the rise to the top is blocked by barricades of institutionalized arrogance and aristocratic snobbery of the kind that rejects talent and ability in the name of one's bloodline. Many ambitious young people fall by the wayside; few will even try.
Joseph Page, a lawyer who taught at the University of Maryland, wrote a definitive biography of Perón published in English and available in Spanish translation. In his book, he rejects the fascist label in regards to his life, and also rejects the train of thought that Perón was sympathetic to Nazi criminals and harbored them in Argentina. Just like with the United States, Perón recruited many Nazi scientists in order to bolster science and technology in Argentina, thinking his new revolution would be a showplace of modern scientific development and technology. Page, also, rejects any comparison between Juan Perón and Hugo Chávez, stating that Perón was a cultured man, a student of history and philosophy. Chávez has his petrodollars.
Another biographer of Perón, Horacio Váquez-Rial who wrote a Spanish-language biography of him, also rejects the fascist label for Perón, who was a cultured and well-read man, disliked violence, allowed an opposition to exist and built his Peronist state around strong state-controlled unions and a benevolent welfare state. In contrast to the rigid and cold authoritarian personality engendered by fascism, Perón was a warm and intelligent man with tremendous confidence in his conception of the world.
In her book, Peron’s Women, Andrea Bellota points out that Perón had a great affinity for women, needed a woman in his life and had a great love for Evita, and some of the other women in his life. After the death of Evita, he had a young girl, Nellie Rivas, living at his house, an act of good will in where he acted as a father to a young girl who adored him. Accused by his enemies of "estupro" or undermining the morals of a minor, Nellie Rivas had only admirable things to say about the "General" calling him a perfect gentleman, someone who helped her advance in life without taking advantage of her in any way. At that time, it was believed Perón had no children of his own.
Unlike religious conservatives and fascist ideologies, that tend to relegate women to raising children and cooking, Perón respected the women in his life and relied deeply on them to advance his political agenda. One of the most crucial components of Perón’s power was his wife Eva Duarte, a powerful speaker who had a deep-rooted and binding relationship with the so-called shirtless people, the disenfranchised and powerless masses who were at the mercy of the conservative and elite classes of privilege and power.
They were an excellent team. Peron was the intelligence and the philosophy behind the revolution; Evita the emotion, the gut, the mystical chanteuse of the Argentine masses. The tone of her voice, filled with pain and emotion, had a hypnotic effect on large crowds. She spoke the language of the dispossessed and she spoke from hard experience. Although possessed of fine tastes and superior appetites, she had a binding link with the anonymous masses, the focal point of Peron’s political philosophy.
When I was in Buenos Aires in 2005, I spent an afternoon at the Institute of Perón, watching the documentary by Leonardo Flavio called: Perón: Symphony of a Feeling. What struck me more than anything was the charismatic power of both the General and Evita Perón. They radiated charisma, a feeling that seemed to engulf the crowd. Evita was even more magnetic. This was much more than a political act. It was a deep-seated pain, agony and affinity manifesting in political discourse.
When Evita died in 1952, many of the writers familiar with Peron, speculate that he lost much of the desire to continue his revolution. He retreated more to his private residence and seemed to lack the spark and vigor of previous times.
Tomas Eloy Martinez, the author of the The Novel of Perón and The Lives of the General is another author who paints a real-life portrait of Perón that goes much beyond the cheap myths and stereotypes one hears in the media. Of special interest is his The Novel of Perón set in 1973 the year of Perón's return to Argentina after 17 years in exile. In this book, one sees a diminished Perón absent his great powers, sick and close to death, surrounded by palace vultures ready to exploit the General's weakness, drunk with power lust and the thought of being at the top of the ladder of
Other authors who knew Perón talk about his great charm and intelligence, often winning over people with the power of his personality, captivating them with his intelligence and charisma. He was very much a man of philosophy and ideas, and was never reluctant to offer his point of view to doubters. In watching documentaries of him in action and giving speeches, I was struck by the great certainty of his demeanor, the intellectual certainty of great man. However, as with all great people, the General had his weaknesses. Felix Luna, a renowned Argentine historian and writer, describes Perón as a fabulador, or one given to create or make up stories. Luna goes on to say that Perón lived in his own world and perhaps never realized some of the consequences of his actions.
Once in power, Perón and Evita spent large sums of money on public works projects, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, schools and sports centers. They established a department of education, made education compulsory between six and fourteen, and built universities in all parts of Argentina. In many ways, Peron’s regime was similar to Roosevelt’s New Deal, a benevolent welfare state aimed at social justice and redistribution of wealth.
As part of his program for economic independence, Perón nationalized the central bank, the train lines, the telephone company, the gas companies and electric transmission facilities. He built a modern airport, dams, chemical plants, introduced atomic energy, strived to build fighter planes and even had plans to produce Argentine cars.
Although hostile to the liberalism and the freedom of the American economy, Perón was not hostile to capital per se, only to the fact that he saw American businessmen as too independent, to able to establish their own agenda. He saw this as economic anarchy and sought to impose state control in order to further a spirit of cooperation. Thus, businessmen who advanced under Perón were those who gained benefits from the State—protection and favors, or monopoly positions in the marketplace. Independent union leaders under Perón were replaced by those loyal to him, which was very much in line with his intention of having the unions always under control of the State. The unions were to be favored but never independent of the benefactor state.
Remaining neutral during World War II, Argentina was able to sell its grains and beef to foreign markets and gather huge reserves of currency for the future. However, by the late forties and early fifties with the return of normalcy and having exhausted his reserves on public spending, his government saw itself strapped for cash and looking for foreign investment. In addition, Argentine industry, controlled and weighted down by union rules and heavily protected by the State, could not compete in the world market.
It was at this juncture that Perón altered his extreme view of economic nationalism and his somewhat hostile view of American economic activity, often labeled promiscuously as capitalism, and invited American companies to invest in Argentina. Milton Eisenhower, the brother of the president, visited Argentina and was wined and dined. A controversial agreement was signed with Standard Oil of California, and they were given free reign to explore and develop in areas of Argentina. .
One of the most conflictive situations of the Perón regime was the battle with Catholic Church, which tended to resent the competition of Perón’s youth groups and his popularity amongst the working class. All of this culminated in 1955 with an open battle between the Church and the Peronist Party. Peron responded by legalizing divorce, stripping the Church of its privileged educational position in schools, arresting Catholic clergyman, legalizing brothels, and passing a law that gave full citizenship to children born out of wedlock.
Church opposition to Peron’s regime grew. In 1955, the navy tried to kill Peron by bombarding the Plaza del Mayo and the presidential palace, but only managed to kill between 200 and 400 private citizens. Later in 1955, the military rebelled again and Perón fled to Paraguay under the protection of Alfredo Stroessner, the Paraguayan dictator. He was to live in exile for 17 years.
The Finale and his Legacy
On the day that Perón returned from exile, there was a shootout at the airport between different Peronist factions, and reports have the injures and deaths in scores of people. In 1974 he was again elected president by an overwhelming margin and within eight months he was dead. He wife Isabel Peron, an ex-dancer who he met in exile in Panamá, became president, and Perón’s ex-private secretary, a man named Jose López Rega, nicknamed "The Sorcerer" because of his love for the occult and witchcraft, became the de facto president.
Perhaps near the end of his life, Perón was too sick to realize the consequences of his actions. Most writers and intellectuals in Argentina recognize his decision to post his wife as vice president as a horrendous error that was to have dire consequences for the future of Argentina. An ex-dancer with no political experience, knowledge or talent in this area, her time in office was notable for indecision and incompetence. Not having the knowledge of what to do, she relegated most power to Jose López Rega, a mystical witch doctor of power, who responded with state-sanctioned violence and murder to quell the violence of the communist left.
Under Isabel and López Rega, Argentina fell into a cycle of violence and economic disarray. Lopez Vega was reported to be the head of an anti-communist death squad called the Triple AAA. This death squad was formed to counter the left-wing violence at the hands of the Montoneros, a socialist Catholic group intent on violent revolution, and the even more violent ERP, a Maoist group convinced that violent revolution was the only path to a new Argentina.
Isabel Perón and López Rega lasted less than two years, as chaos, violence, political murders and assassinations as well as economic disaster became everyday occurrences. In 1976, Peron’s wife was overthrown by a military junta. She fled to Spain, where she lives to this day. The military dictatorship ruled Argentina until 1983.
Today, Perón’s influence is still very much alive in Latin America, and in other parts of the world. The Third Way philosophy of Perón is apparent everywhere, from the mixed economy of United States to the deluted communism of China. None other than Hugo Chavéz mentioned Peròn as one of his heroes, and has used the analogy of the third alternative or the third way between savage capitalism and totalitarianism. Even though rarely admitted to all the economies in Latin America are a mixture between heavy state ownership and regulation, privileged businessman, large government sponsored unions and benevolent welfare-state programs that seek to establish "social justice," one of Perón's favorite concepts. As in Perón's time, the Church, the intellectuals, the media, the conservatives and the radical left are all hostile to liberalism, and its emphasis on dismantling state influence.
Perón sought a benevolent welfare state with the big unions as his power base in order to further his concept of social justice. He ran three times as a candidate, and was elected three times by large margins. In a sense, he was the democratic man par excellence, a marvelous manipulator of mass psychology and opinion.
Joseph Page, in his biography, compares him to Hughie Long, the ex-governor of Louisiana, who was a democratic phenomenon in his time and a bridge between the elite conservative forces of the old South and the Marxist theories of the state that were being propagated in the universities and intellectual circles of America in the thirties.
The word often used to describe these men is populist in that they had a pulse on the heartbeat of their turf, and often followed programs catering to popular wants and desires rather than what reality required in order to develop the economy.
Perón had little knowledge of economic consequences and took a huge war-time surplus and spent it on his pet projects. He was like a patriarch catering to his flock, bestowing presents and dreams on them, in order to reward them for their good behavior and adherence to his message. He is like the utopian visionary who seeks to establish heaven on earth but has no conception of how to accomplish it. Yet, when the money is flowing and the gold is in the pot, all is well with the world, and the king marches to his own band.
In the late sixties and seventies, several left-wing groups sympathetic to Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and communism adopted Peron as their own and sought to use his name to advance their ideas of a Marxist state. One of these groups was the Montoneros, composed of socialist Catholics, who believed in the armed struggle to a Marxist state. The Montoneros were famous for kidnapping and murdering the ex-president of Argentina, Pedro Aramburu. (Peron objected to them)
In addition to this, John William Cooke, Perón’s heir apparent, was an admirer of Castro’s communist revolution and wanted to combine these ideas with his conception of Peronism. However, Perón himself, although sympathetic to national socialism, was not an admirer of the Marxist version, and definitely saw communism as a blight to the working man. In fact, during the Cold War, many people in the American State Department, saw Perón as a counterweight to communism in South America, and urged support for his government.
Perón's legacy is as important today as it was during the forties and fifties. The names and faces change but if one looks, one can see the mark of Juan Domingo Perón all over Latin America and in the rest of the world, including the United States. In Argentina, the Peronist Party has an overwhelming influence on the Argentina’s political life, although without Perón at the helm, it seems to lack a direction or cohesion.
The present president of Argentina, Nelson Kirchner, is from the Peronist party, although from the left wing of the party. Yet, this notwithstanding, he follows the same Peronist prescription of heavy government control of the economy and a disdain for unfettered market transactions and trade. Kirchner harbors an anti-American attitude and has aligned himself with Hugo Chávez, although he follows a much more discreet path. Carlos Menen, the ex-president, was also from the Peronist Party, although from the right wing. He had a good relationship with the United States, sometimes referred to as "carnal." During his presidency, the market was opened up as was the channels of corruption.
Although associated with Fidel Castro and the socialism of Cuba, Hugo Chávez has mentioned Juan Perón favorably on many occasions and enjoys a close relationship with the present Peronist president. Ironically, rather than following the strict Marxist ideology of Castro, Chávez has traveled down a path much more reminiscent of Juan Perón: heavy state control and regulation while most small businesses remain in private hands.
In other parts of Latin America, the influence of Perón is still very noticeable. Economic nationalism is rampant south of the border, and Perón’s admonition of "vendepatria" or selling out the fatherland to foreign interests in still common. Evo Morales, another admirer of Castro, has been an advocate of this train of thought, the belief that "our national resources" must belong to the Bolivians, and administered by the State.
Even in Costa Rica, which has strongly liberalized its economy in recent years, the influence of Perón can be seen. The giant insurance and electric monopolies are state owned and the argument against privatizing them is that they must belong to Costa Rica, and to do otherwise is unpatriotic, or another instance of "vendepatria."
If one looks close enough one sees this same Peronist phenomenon with Ollanta Humala in Perú and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, both men advocates of economic nationalism and the belief that foreign investment or influence in the economy is destructive to national interests.
In the United States, the third way between a genuine free market absent of government control and totalitarianism is very apparent. The role of the benevolent State in all affairs of life is enormous and probably extends way beyond anything reached by Perón. Ironically, the country often castigated for being the home of savage capitalism is now the home of the largest and most efficient state apparatus the world has ever seen.
So the legacy of Juan Domingo Perón lives on. To the dispossessed of Latin America, ideology has little meaning. Only the knowledge that someone is willing to help them has any relevance. For the wide, democratic mass of people, struggling to keep their head above water, the only question is how much a leader like Peron can do for them and that he is speaking about changing their lives.
Surely, Juan Domingo Perón still walks along the shadows of Latin American history, the spirit and power behind the dispossessed of the world. They are all looking for that soothing lotion or narcotic voice that will lessen their burden and make them feel like they are part of something, and like Perón, the present crop of leaders offer alternatives to the corrosive corruption, arrogance and instability of the chaotic democracies that inhabit this part of the world. With someone like Perón at their side to do their fighting, the displaced and hopeless "descamisados" of despair can, at least in their dreams, rise above the loneliness and isolation of people without hope or future: the forlorn masses condemned to another night of screaming into the wilderness or into the dark hole of poverty and despair.
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